Affirmative action policies have been shown to induce talented women to compete in laboratory contexts. However, evidence from actual policy changes is more ambiguous. While existing laboratory experiments have exclusively analyzed gender quotas in one-shot tournaments, we focus on a setting that models real life examples, such as quotas in corporate boards, more closely: quotas implemented at the final round of a multistage elimination contest. We find that later-stage quotas increase female participation already in the first round of the tournament, showing that women are responsive to changes in the option value of continued competition. Quotas also increase high-ability women’s representation among the final-stage competitors without significantly reducing entry among men, thereby promoting diversity without harming efficiency. We provide evidence for the importance of relative performance beliefs in determining the response to quotas among both genders.

中文翻译：

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永远不会太晚：多阶段锦标赛决赛中的性别配额

积极行动政策已被证明可以诱使有才能的妇女在实验室中竞争。但是，实际政策变化的证据更加模糊。尽管现有的实验室实验只对一次锦标赛中的性别配额进行了分析，但我们将重点放在更真实地模拟现实生活中的例子（例如公司董事会中的配额）的环境上：在多阶段淘汰赛的最后一轮实施的配额。我们发现，后期配额已经在锦标赛的第一轮中增加了女性的参与度，表明女性对持续竞争的期权价值的变化做出了反应。配额还增加了高能力女性在最后阶段竞争者中的代表性，而又没有显着减少男性的进入，从而在不损害效率的情况下促进了多样性。