Abstract This article examines the structure and performance of conservation agreements, which are relational contracts used across the world to protect natural resources. Key elements of these agreements are (1) they are ongoing arrangements between a local community and an outside party, typically a nongovernmental organization (NGO); (2) they feature payments in exchange for conservation services; (3) the prospects for success depend on the NGO engaging in costly monitoring to detect whether the community is foregoing short-term gains to protect the resource; (4) lacking a strong external enforcement system, they rely on self-enforcement; and (5) the parties have the opportunity to renegotiate at any time. A repeated-game model is developed and utilized to organize an evaluation of real conservation agreements, using three case studies as representative examples. (JEL D74, D86, Q20, Q56)

中文翻译：

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保护协议：带有内生监控的关系合同

摘要本文探讨了保护协议的结构和绩效，保护协议是世界范围内用于保护自然资源的关系合同。这些协议的关键要素是：（1）它们是当地社区与外部团体（通常是非政府组织）之间正在进行的安排；（2）以付款为交换条件，以换取养护服务；（3）成功的前景取决于非政府组织进行昂贵的监测，以发现社区是否在利用短期利益来保护资源；（4）缺乏强有力的外部执法体系，他们依靠自我执法；（5）双方有机会在任何时候重新谈判。开发了重复博弈模型，并将其用于组织对真实保护协议的评估，以三个案例研究为代表。（JEL D74，D86，Q20，Q56）