We revisit the economics of “platform envelopment strategies,” whereby a dominant platform (the enveloper) operating in a multi-sided market (the origin market) enters a second multi-sided market (the target market) by leveraging the data obtained from its shared user relationships. In particular, we analyze the logic and effects of “privacy policy tying,” a strategy whereby the enveloper requests consumers to grant their consent to combining their data in both origin and target markets. This may allow the enveloper to fund the services offered to all sides of the target market by monetizing data in the origin market, monopolize the target market, and entrench its dominant position in the origin market. We conclude by considering a range of possible policy interventions that may serve to limit such potential anticompetitive effects, while preserving the efficiencies generated by conglomerate platforms.

中文翻译：

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利用数字世界中的平台包络

我们重新审视“平台包围策略”的经济学原理，即在多平台市场（原始市场）中运行的主导平台（信封）通过利用从其获取的数据进入第二多方市场（目标市场）。共享的用户关系。尤其是，我们分析了“隐私政策捆绑”的逻辑和影响，“捆绑政策”是一种策略，通过该策略，信封用户要求消费者同意将其在原始市场和目标市场中的数据组合在一起。这可以使包封者通过货币化原始市场中的数据，垄断目标市场并巩固其在原始市场中的主导地位来为提供给目标市场各方的服务提供资金。最后，我们考虑了一系列可能限制这种潜在的反竞争影响的政策干预措施，