Assuming the two retailers decide whether to acquire information to segment consumers and price them differently, we investigate the problem of information acquisition and third-degree price discrimination in the supply chain composed of one common manufacturer and duopoly retailers. We explore how the supply chain members’ pricing decisions are affected by the fraction of high price-sensitivity consumers and the consumers’ difference in price sensitivity. Analytical results show that the manufacturer’s wholesale price increases with the fraction of high price-sensitivity consumers and decreases with the consumers’ difference in price sensitivity. Moreover, if a retailer chooses to acquire information and price discriminate, the retail prices for two types of consumers increase with the fraction of high price-sensitivity consumers. However, the retail price for consumers with high (low) price sensitivity decreases (increases) with the consumers’ difference in terms of price sensitivity. By comparing the results among different information acquisition and price discrimination decisions, we find that there exist two possible equilibrium decisions for both retailers: both retailers acquire information and price discriminate and no retailer acquires information and each charges a uniform price for all consumers. The strategy which dominates depends on the fraction of high price-sensitivity consumers and the consumers’ difference in price sensitivity. However, compared with no retailer acquiring information, the manufacturer is better off when two retailers acquire information. Consequently, the manufacturer designs a fixed fee contract to stimulate retailers to price discriminate and to achieve a win-win situation for them finally.

中文翻译：

---

与一个常见的制造商和双寡头零售商在供应链中的内生第三度价格歧视

假设两家零售商决定是否获取信息以细分消费者并对其定价，那么我们将调查由一个常见的制造商和双头垄断零售商组成的供应链中的信息获取和三级价格歧视问题。我们探讨了高价格敏感性消费者的比例和消费者对价格敏感性的差异如何影响供应链成员的定价决策。分析结果表明，制造商的批发价格随着对价格敏感度高的消费者所占比例的增加而增加，而随着消费者对价格敏感度的差异而降低。此外，如果零售商选择获取信息并区分价格，则两种类型的消费者的零售价格会随对价格敏感度高的消费者所占的比例增加。然而，具有高（低）价格敏感性的消费者的零售价格会随着消费者在价格敏感性方面的差异而降低（增加）。通过比较不同信息获取和价格歧视决策之间的结果，我们发现两个零售商都有两个可能的均衡决策：两个零售商都获取信息和价格歧视，没有零售商获取信息，并且每个零售商都对所有消费者收取统一的价格。占主导地位的策略取决于对价格敏感度高的消费者的比例以及消费者对价格敏感度的差异。但是，与没有零售商获取信息相比，当两个零售商获取信息时，制造商的状况会更好。所以，