Abstract

Prominent dual process models assert that reasoning processes can transition from effortful (Type 2) to intuitive (Type 1) with increases in domain-specific experience. In two studies we directly examine this automation hypothesis. We examine the nature of the relationship between mathematical experience and performance on the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick, 2005 Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4), 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196732[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We test performance and response time at different levels of experience and cognitive constraint. Participants are required to complete a secondary task of varying complexity while solving the CRT. In Study 1, we demonstrate changes in thinking Type across real-world differences in mathematical experience. In Study 2, convergent with Study 1, we demonstrate changes in thinking Type across a mathematical training paradigm. Our findings suggest that for some individuals low experience is associated with Type 1 processing, intermediate experience is associated with Type 2 processing, and high experience is associated with Type 1 processing. Whereas, for other individuals low experience is associated with ineffective Type 2 processing, intermediate experience is associated with effective Type 2 processing, and high experience is associated with Type 1 processing.

摘要

杰出的双重过程模型断言，推理过程可以随着特定领域经验的增加而从努力（类型2）过渡到直观（类型1）。在两项研究中，我们直接检查了这种自动化假设。我们在认知反射测试中检查了数学经验与绩效之间关系的性质（CRT; Frederick，2005 弗雷德里克（Frederick，S.）（2005年）。认知反思与决策。经济观点杂志，19（4），25 – 42。https://doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196732 [Crossref]，[Web of Science®]  ，[Google Scholar]）。我们在不同水平的经验和认知约束下测试性能和响应时间。要求参与者在解决CRT时完成复杂程度各异的次要任务。在研究1中，我们展示了跨越现实世界中数学经验差异的思维类型的变化。在研究2中，与研究1融合，我们证明了数学训练范式中思维类型的变化。我们的发现表明，对于某些人，低经验与1型加工相关，中级经验与2型加工相关，而高经验与1型加工相关。而对于其他人，经验不足与无效的2型处理相关，而中等经验与有效的2型处理相关，