Abstract

I present a critical discussion of dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making with particular attention to the nature and role of Type 2 processes. The original theory proposed that A: Type 2 processes serve to rationalise and support intuitive choices. For most of its history, however, such accounts have emphasised instead B: Type 2 processes reason to conclusions or decisions. B is part of the “received theory” of dual processing, often inaccurately linked to the idea that Type 2 reasoning is necessary for correct solutions. While not mutually exclusive, the evidence for each proposition is assessed. I then present a default-interventionist model which incorporates both propositions A and B. This is consistent with evidence that reasoning to support the default intuition is the norm, although intervention may also occur. Other issues discussed include (1) whether we should treat Type 2 as well as Type 1 processing as originating from multiple systems, (2) whether we need to separate postulate “Type 3” processes to explain underlying cognitive control and attention switching, and (3) whether recent experimental observations of “logical intuitions” undermine the default-interventionist approach. I point to some new directions in which research on dual processes may proceed.

摘要

我将对推理和决策的双过程理论进行批判性讨论，尤其要注意类型2过程的性质和作用。原始理论提出：答：类型2流程有助于合理化和支持直观选择。但是，在其大部分历史中，此类说明都强调了B：类型2处理得出结论或做出决定的原因。B是双重处理的“已接受理论”的一部分，通常不正确地与类型2推理对于正确解决方案必不可少的思想联系在一起。虽然不是互斥的，但每个命题的证据都经过评估。然后，我提出了一个默认干预模型，其中包含了命题A和B。这与支持默认直觉的推理是常态的证据是一致的，尽管也可能会发生干预。讨论的其他问题包括：（1）我们是否应将类型2和类型1处理视为源自多个系统；（2）是否需要将假定的“类型3”过程分开以解释潜在的认知控制和注意力转移；以及（ 3）最近对“逻辑直觉”的实验观察是否破坏了默认干预主义方法。我指出了可能进行双重过程研究的一些新方向。