This study examines the endogenous vertical structure in which each manufacturer sells its product to its exclusive retailer who sells network goods to consumers (i.e. a duopoly in the upstream market) under Bertrand competition and Cournot competition with network externalities. We show that with strong (weak) network externalities under Bertrand competition, (a) it is a dominant strategy for each manufacturer to integrate (separate) its retailer; (b) with strong network externalities, the manufacturers’ profits, consumers’ surplus and social welfare are higher under vertical integration than under vertical separation. Under Cournot competition, (a) vertical separation is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; (b) with strong network externalities, the manufacturers’ profits, consumers’ surplus and social welfare are higher under vertical separation than under vertical integration.

中文翻译：

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具有网络外部性的内生垂直结构

这项研究考察了内生的垂直结构，在这种结构中，每个制造商将其产品出售给其独家零售商，后者在网络外部性的竞争下，在Bertrand竞争和Cournot竞争下，将网络商品出售给消费者（即上游市场的双头垄断）。我们证明，在Bertrand竞争下，网络外部性很强（弱），（a）每个制造商整合（分离）零售商的主要策略是；（b）在强大的网络外部性下，垂直整合下的制造商利润，消费者剩余和社会福利高于垂直分离下的制造商。在古诺竞争下，（a）纵向分离是独特的子博弈完美的纳什均衡；（b）强大的网络外部性，制造商的利润，