We study technology transfer in a spatial competition with two asymmetric licensees (firms) with an outside innovator who decides how many licenses to offer and the optimal licensing contract. We show the optimal licensing policy is pure royalty contract to both licensees leading to a complete diffusion of the new technology. The result holds irrespective of the cost differentials between the licensees and for innovation of all sizes, that is, drastic or non‐drastic. This robust finding although supports the dominance of royalty licensing in practice; however, consumers may not be necessarily better off. We also throw light on the situation where the innovator sells the patent right to one of the firms. Interestingly, we find that the inefficient firm acquires the new technology and further licenses it to the efficient rival.

中文翻译：

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被许可人不对称时空间竞争中的技术转让

我们与两名不对称的被许可人（公司）与外部创新者一起在空间竞争中研究技术转让，外部创新者决定要提供多少个许可以及最佳许可合同。我们显示最佳的许可政策是对两个被许可人的纯版税合同，从而导致新技术的完全传播。不论被许可人之间的成本差异如何，无论是否进行各种规模的创新，结果都将保持不变。这一有力的发现尽管支持了特许使用权在实践中的主导地位。但是，消费者不一定会过上更好的生活。我们还阐明了创新者将专利权出售给其中一家公司的情况。有趣的是，我们发现效率低下的公司获得了新技术，并将其进一步许可给效率高的竞争对手。