We develop a model of the neoclassical firm under moral hazard with endogenous capital and employment and perfectly competitive capital, labor and product markets. We assume that effort becomes harder to measure as the firm gets larger and the exogenous parameters are affiliated. The model explains why incentives decline but wages rise with firm size, the mixed evidence on the risk‐reward tradeoff, and the positive correlation between wages and profits. In the long run, incentives are increasing in risk via endogenous capital. Finally, the model makes novel predictions about the relationship between incentives and labor market conditions.

中文翻译：

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道德风险下的新古典主义企业

我们建立具有道德风险的新古典主义公司的模型，该模型具有内生的资本和就业以及完全竞争的资本，劳动力和产品市场。我们假设随着公司规模的扩大和外部参数的加入，工作量将变得难以衡量。该模型解释了为什么激励措施减少而工资随企业规模而增加，风险与收益权衡的混合证据以及工资与利润之间的正相关性为何。从长远来看，通过内生资本的激励措施正在增加风险。最后，该模型对激励与劳动力市场条件之间的关系做出了新颖的预测。