Most observed institutional arrangements, in governments, firms, and other organizations, acknowledge the effectiveness of imposing sanctioning institutions and monitoring policies to achieve particular goals. However, less attention has been paid to the influences of the delegation mechanism of sanctioning power. In particular, it remains unclear whether the mechanism influences the legitimacy of the authority/institution, in centralized institutional arrangements. We report laboratory-experimental results of a public goods game that compare the performance of exogenous (i.e., the Leviathan) versus endogenous (i.e., the Democracy) delegation of sanctioning power. Observed differences are not statistically significant, regardless of the effectiveness of sanctions imposed, tested in two experiments with different punishment/cost functions. Democratic schemes in centralized power environments should not be taken for granted. Experimental evidence contradicts the common belief of a robust causal relationship between indirect democratic institutions, collective action, and economic outcomes.

在政府，企业和其他组织中观察到的大多数机构安排都承认实施制裁机构和监测政策以实现特定目标的有效性。但是，对制裁权下放机制的影响关注较少。特别是，目前尚不清楚该机制是否在集中式机构安排中影响当局/机构的合法性。我们报告了一项公共产品博弈的实验室实验结果，该结果比较了制裁权的外在授权（即利维坦）与内在授权（即民主）的表现。无论在两个具有不同惩罚/成本函数的实验中测试的制裁有效性如何，观察到的差异在统计上均不显着。集中式电力环境中的民主计划不应被视为理所当然。实验证据与间接民主制度，集体行动和经济成果之间牢固的因果关系的普遍看法相矛盾。