Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”

中文翻译：

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不完全执法下的最佳监管：许可证，票证还是两者兼而有之？

经济活动通常通过许可证和票证（随后的检查）进行监管。在腐败和地下经济使执法不完善的情况下，我们研究了此类政策的有效性。在理论模型中，不对称信息证明了由腐败的官僚实施的监管行为是合理的。我们发现，如果存在腐败，仅凭许可证进行监管是没有用的，而机票仍然可以带来一些好处。令人惊讶的是，我们还发现，同时具有许可证和票证的系统所获得的福利要高于仅凭票证所能实现的福利-将这两种机制结合起来所产生的效果要大于“各部分之和”。