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Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”*
Scottish Journal of Political Economy ( IF 0.9 ) Pub Date : 2020-06-25 , DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.12249
Robert Butler 1 , Liam J. A. Lenten 2 , Patrick Massey 3
Affiliation  

This study explores the effect of bonus incentive mechanisms with a focus on how such a scheme influences aggregate production levels of teams of workers, specifically. We identify this using data from a highly competitive setting in professional sport, which involves a unique tournament design rule in an elite European rugby competition. The modelling results demonstrate qualified evidence that introducing bonuses to encourage teams to score via the most‐difficult, highest‐reward mode, incentivizes teams to increase effort to earn the bonus, and without reducing production after the bonus is achieved.

中文翻译:

奖励激励和团队努力水平:来自“领域”的证据*

这项研究探讨了奖金激励机制的效果,重点是这种方案如何影响工人团队的总生产水平。我们使用来自专业运动中高度竞争环境的数据来识别这一点,这涉及欧洲精英橄榄球比赛中独特的比赛设计规则。建模结果表明,有充分的证据表明引入奖金以鼓励团队通过最困难,最高奖励的方式得分,激励团队加大努力以获取奖金,而在获得奖金后不降低产量。
更新日期:2020-06-25
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