Monetary policy and financial regulation have been regarded one of the paradigmatic domains where states can reap the benefits of delegating clearly delineated and unequivocal policy tasks to specialized technocrats. This article discusses the negative side-effects and unintended consequences of particular ways to partition such tasks. The separation between monetary policy formulation, central banks' money market management, and financial supervision has weakened policy makers' capacities to address risks associated with banks' active liability management and to mitigate pro-cyclical dynamics in money markets. These adverse effects derive from the neglect of liquidity as a regulatory problem in formal task descriptions; from the obstacles to positive coordination between specialized technocrats in the self-contained domains of monetary policy formulation, implementation, and prudential regulation; and from a dissociation between formal responsibilities, which lie with regulators, and the resources residing in money market divisions – market expertise and influence over counterparties – that are critical to influence bank behavior. I explore these mechanisms with an in-depth case study of British monetary and financial governance between 1970 and 2007. I posit that we can generalize the respective mechanisms to explore unintended effects of ‘agencification’ and to contribute to a broader re-assessment of those organizing principles that have guided the construction of ‘new regulatory states’.

中文翻译：

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新监管状态下的监管分工、机构关闭和结构保密：市场银行中被忽视的流动性风险案例

货币政策和金融监管已被视为范式领域之一，在这些领域，国家可以通过将明确界定和明确的政策任务委派给专门的技术官僚来获得好处。本文讨论了划分此类任务的特定方法的负面影响和意外后果。货币政策制定、中央银行货币市场管理和金融监管之间的分离削弱了政策制定者应对与银行主动负债管理相关风险和缓解货币市场顺周期动态的能力。这些不利影响源于在正式任务描述中忽视流动性作为监管问题；从货币政策制定、实施和审慎监管等独立领域的专业技术官僚之间积极协调的障碍；监管机构的正式职责与货币市场部门的资源（市场专业知识和对交易对手的影响）之间的分离，这对影响银行行为至关重要。我通过对 1970 年至 2007 年间英国货币和金融治理的深入案例研究来探索这些机制。我认为我们可以概括各自的机制，以探索“代理化”的意外影响，并有助于对这些机制进行更广泛的重新评估指导“新监管国家”建设的组织原则。监管机构的正式职责与货币市场部门的资源（市场专业知识和对交易对手的影响）之间的分离，这对影响银行行为至关重要。我通过对 1970 年至 2007 年间英国货币和金融治理的深入案例研究来探索这些机制。我认为我们可以概括各自的机制，以探索“代理化”的意外影响，并有助于对这些机制进行更广泛的重新评估指导“新监管国家”建设的组织原则。监管机构的正式职责与货币市场部门的资源（市场专业知识和对交易对手的影响）之间的分离，这对影响银行行为至关重要。我通过对 1970 年至 2007 年间英国货币和金融治理的深入案例研究来探索这些机制。我认为我们可以概括各自的机制，以探索“代理化”的意外影响，并有助于对这些机制进行更广泛的重新评估指导“新监管国家”建设的组织原则。