In organizations, conflict revolves around the use of shared resources. Research on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas suggests that to reduce such conflict, organizations could facilitate the psychological privatization of commons resources. We introduce a model that helps understand how psychologically privatizing organizational commons resources—to prevent the overuse problem of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, G. Science, 162, 1968, 1243)—can lead to the emergence of another resource dilemma. We develop a model that illustrates how resource complexity and group complexity increase psychological marking and defending behaviors. These behaviors potentially lead to a problem of resource underuse—a tragedy of the anticommons (Heller, M. A. Harvard Law Review, 111, 1998, 621)—in organizational settings. The conceptual model, integrating insights from research on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas with law and social psychology, provides a bottom-up behavioral explanation of the emergence of the tragedy of the anticommons in organizations and outlines opportunities for future research.

中文翻译：

---

太多的厨师破坏了肉汤：关于反公地悲剧如何在组织中出现的理论

在组织中，冲突围绕共享资源的使用展开。对产权、地域性和社会困境的研究表明，为了减少这种冲突，组织可以促进公共资源的心理私有化。我们引入了一个模型，该模型有助于理解在心理上将组织公地资源私有化——以防止公地悲剧的过度使用问题（Hardin, G. Science , 162, 1968, 1243）——如何导致另一个资源困境的出现。我们开发了一个模型来说明资源复杂性和群体复杂性如何增加心理标记和防御行为。这些行为可能导致资源利用不足的问题——反公地的悲剧（Heller, MA Harvard Law Review , 111, 1998, 621）——在组织环境中。该概念模型将产权、地域性和社会困境研究的见解与法律和社会心理学相结合，为组织中反公地悲剧的出现提供了自下而上的行为解释，并概述了未来研究的机会。