This theory article argues that negotiation is often played as a finite game that consists of a known number of players using an agreed‐upon set of rules (when parties are bargaining in good faith) aimed at achieving a specific outcome. However, activities and events leading up to negotiation can be viewed as an infinite game that has no fixed entities such as personnel, rules, and outcomes. Thus, a critical moment occurs when parties agree to make the transition from some infinite game, like conflict, to the finite game of negotiation. This article explores the conditions leading up to this critical transition and provides two examples of negotiations—one that successfully made the transition and one in which the transition did not occur—to illustrate how these conditions function in actual contexts.

中文翻译：

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关键时刻从无限游戏过渡到有限游戏

这篇理论文章认为，谈判通常是一场有限的游戏，由已知数量的参与者组成，他们使用达成一致的规则（当各方进行诚意讨价还价时）达成特定的结果。但是，导致谈判的活动和事件可以看作是没有固定实体（例如人员，规则和结果）的无限游戏。因此，当各方同意从某种无限博弈（例如冲突）过渡到有限协商博弈时，就会发生关键时刻。本文探讨了导致此关键过渡的条件，并提供了两个谈判示例（一个成功进行了过渡，另一个没有发生过渡），以说明这些条件在实际情况下如何发挥作用。