Within the context of a unionized duopoly with decentralized Right‐to‐Manage wage negotiations, this paper investigates how different measures of product market cooperation impact firms' profitability. In the presence of exogenous production costs, a classical result in industrial economics is that conjectural derivatives (CD) and conjectural elasticities (CE) lead to similar results, and CE reproduce exactly the same output decision level (and, therefore, profits) of the coefficient of cooperation (CC). These results show that wage bargaining alters those relations; in particular, the equivalence of the CE and CC no longer holds true.

中文翻译：

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联盟谈判，产品市场合作和利润

在具有权力下放的权利管理工资谈判的工会双头垄断的背景下，本文研究了产品市场合作的不同措施如何影响企业的盈利能力。在存在外部生产成本的情况下，工业经济学中的经典结果是，猜想导数（CD）和猜想弹性（CE）导致相似的结果，并且CE再现了完全相同的产出决策水平（因此，是利润）。合作系数（CC）。这些结果表明，薪资谈判改变了这种关系。特别是，CE和CC的对等不再成立。