Constitutions are an important feature of many authoritarian regimes. But what role do they in fact perform in processes of authoritarian regime stabilization and legitimation? Much of the contemporary literature focuses on authoritarian constitutionalism in transitions away from constitutional democracy. This article considers the opposite scenario: pre‐emptive constitution‐making as a mechanism of authoritarian constitutionalism to contain a potential transition toward constitutional democracy. This is illustrated through the case of Myanmar. Since the 1960s, Myanmar has experienced successive periods of direct military rule without a constitution, followed since 2011 by a new constitution. Adding to the comparative literature on constitutions in authoritarian regimes, this article explains how pre‐emptive constitution‐making limits a transition to liberal democracy and contributes to authoritarian‐regime resilience. This article further identifies “military‐state” constitutionalism as a variation of authoritarian constitutionalism in Myanmar. The case of Myanmar offers comparative insights into the ways constitutions are used to contain transitions to constitutional democracy and illustrates the varieties inherent in authoritarian constitutionalism.

中文翻译：

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先发制人的宪法制定：威权宪政与缅甸军队

宪法是许多独裁政权的重要特征。但是，它们实际上在威权政权稳定和合法化过程中起什么作用？当代文学多数集中在从宪政民主过渡的专制宪政主义上。本文考虑了相反的情况：先发制人的宪法制定是威权宪政的一种机制，可以遏制向宪政民主的潜在过渡。缅甸就是一个例子。自1960年代以来，缅甸经历了连续的直接军事统治时期，没有宪法，自2011年以来又颁布了新宪法。在有关威权政体宪法的比较文献中，本文解释了先发制人的制宪工作如何限制向自由民主的过渡并有助于威权政权的复原力。本文进一步将“军事国家”立宪主义确定为缅甸威权主义立宪主义的变体。缅甸的案例提供了对宪法用来遏制向宪政民主过渡的方式的比较见解，并说明了威权宪政固有的多样性。