Contemporary international criminal law suggests that head of state immunity does not extend to atrocity crimes, but the executive's office continues to be the safest place for suspected perpetrators. Moreover, indicted suspects can use the threat of international accountability to win democratically contested elections. This article asks how suspects and their surrogates translate an indictment from an international criminal tribunal into an electoral victory and suggests that the path between an indictment and electoral victory unfolds in one of two ways: (1) the consolidation of existing coalitions around the indicted suspects and their allies; or (2) the creation of new coalitions that span existing cleavages. The article evaluates these assumptions through two cases: Lebanon and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and Kenya and the International Criminal Court. These two decidedly different cases exemplify the ways in which coalitional politics shield suspects international accountability and reward them with high office.

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国际刑事责任与国内反抗政治：肯尼亚和黎巴嫩的案例研究

当代国际刑法表明，国家元首豁免权并不适用于残暴罪行，但行政办公室仍然是嫌疑犯最安全的地方。此外，被起诉的嫌疑人可以利用国际责任的威胁赢得民主竞争的选举。本文询问了犯罪嫌疑人及其代理人如何将国际刑事法庭的起诉转变为选举胜利，并提出了起诉和选举胜利之间的途径以两种方式之一展开：（1）巩固被起诉嫌疑人周围的现有联盟和他们的盟友；或（2）建立跨越现有分裂的新联盟。本文通过两种情况评估这些假设：黎巴嫩，黎巴嫩和肯尼亚特别法庭以及国际刑事法院。这两个截然不同的案例说明了联盟政治盾牌怀疑国际责任的方式，并给予他们很高的奖励。