Since the 1970s, advocates have used the term gender neutral to press for legal change in contexts ranging from employment discrimination to marriage equality to public restroom access. Drawing on analyses of all Supreme Court cases, federal courts of appeals cases, and Supreme Court amicus briefs in which the terms gender neutral/neutrality, sex neutral/neutrality, or sexually neutral/sexual neutrality appear, this study examines how US courts have defined gender neutrality and what the scope and limits of its legal application have been. We find that the courts have defined gender neutrality narrowly as facial neutrality, but nonetheless that this limited understanding has transformed some areas of the law, even if it has had little impact on others. Our analysis confirms earlier feminist skepticism about the sufficiency of gender neutrality to guarantee equality but also points to areas in which the law has yet to exploit the idea's significant potential to address discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity.

中文翻译：

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重新评估性别中立

自1970年代以来，拥护者一直使用“性别中立”一词来敦促在从就业歧视到婚姻平等再到公共厕所等各种环境中进行法律变革。利用对所有最高法院案件，联邦上诉法院案件和最高法院法庭之友摘要的分析，其中使用术语“性别中立/中立”，“性别中立/中立”或“性中立/性中立”看起来，这项研究研究了美国法院如何界定性别中立性以及法律适用的范围和限制。我们发现，法院将性别中立狭义地定义为面部中立，但是尽管如此，这种有限的理解改变了法律的某些领域，即使它对其他领域几乎没有影响。我们的分析证实了早期的女权主义者对性别中立是否足以保证平等的怀疑，但同时也指出了法律尚未利用该思想的巨大潜力来解决基于性别，性取向和性别认同的歧视的领域。