Do judges ruling on redistricting litigation increase electoral competition in congressional races while simultaneously drawing districts favoring their party's congressional candidates? I offer a novel theory of judicial partisan calculation, arguing that judges draw more competitive districts than legislatures or commissions, but that judge‐drawn districts favor the electoral interests of their copartisans. These claims are reconcilable because judges target districts held by contrapartisan legislators to maximize their copartisans’ fortunes. I find that Democratic judges draw competitive districts by adding Democratic voters to Republican‐held House constituencies. Court‐administered redistricting increases competitiveness, ostensibly due to judicial neutrality. This mask of neutrality, however, conceals sophisticated partisan calculation.

中文翻译：

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中立的面具：司法党派的计算和立法的重新划分

裁定诉讼范围的法官会增加国会竞选中的选举竞争，同时又吸引偏爱本党国会候选人的地区吗？我提出了一种新颖的司法游击党计算理论，认为法官比立法机关或委员会更具竞争性，但评判性的选举有利于同党的选举利益。这些主张是可以调和的，因为法官的目标是反对党的立法者所拥有的地区，以最大程度地发挥同党的财富。我发现民主党法官通过将民主党选民加入共和党控制的众议院选区来划定竞争性地区。法院管理的重新划分显然是由于司法中立，从而提高了竞争力。然而，这种中立的面具掩盖了复杂的党派计算。