This article builds a new model of capital structure and nonpension investment decisions to show that regulatory and investment incentives created by accrued pension obligations exacerbate traditional agency problems between stockholders and bondholders. The article identifies conditions under which firms with accrued pension liabilities have an incentive to choose an overly risky capital structure, invest in risky projects with negative net present value, and/or under‐fund their pension accounts.

中文翻译：

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养老金监管、企业借贷和投资风险

本文构建了一个新的资本结构和非养老金投资决策模型，以表明由应计养老金义务产生的监管和投资激励加剧了股东和债券持有人之间的传统代理问题。本文确定了在哪些条件下，具有应计养老金负债的公司有动机选择风险过高的资本结构，投资于净现值为负的风险项目，和/或为其养老金账户提供资金不足。