Economists, regulators, and consumer protection agencies have highlighted the welfare losses for consumers who purchase high‐load insurance against modest stakes risks. Mandatory information disclosure is a potentially attractive public policy tool that might improve consumers' choices, but has not been widely tested in insurance settings. We conduct an incentive‐compatible insurance demand experiment, in which we manipulate the information disclosed to subjects. We test whether any of the three most commonly suggested disclosures affect insurance demand, disclosing either (1) the true probability of loss, (2) the contract's expected loss, or (3) the insurer's profit on the transaction. Similar to consumers in naturally occurring insurance markets, subjects in the laboratory demonstrate significant demand for high‐load insurance against modest stakes. However, we find no effect of any of the three disclosure treatments on subjects' insurance choices. We discuss the implications of our results for possible public policy initiatives in insurance markets.

中文翻译：

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信息披露对高额保险需求的影响

经济学家，监管机构和消费者保护机构都强调了购买高额保险以抵御适度风险的消费者的福利损失。强制性信息披露是一种潜在的有吸引力的公共政策工具，可以改善消费者的选择，但尚未在保险环境中进行广泛测试。我们进行了激励兼容的保险需求实验，在该实验中，我们操纵了向受试者披露的信息。我们测试了三种最常见的建议披露中的任何一项是否会影响保险需求，从而披露（1）真正的损失概率，（2）合同的预期损失，或（3）保险公司在交易中的利润。与自然保险市场中的消费者类似，实验室中的受试者表现出对适度赌注的高负荷保险的巨大需求。但是，我们发现这三种披露方法中的任何一种对受试者的保险选择都没有影响。我们讨论了结果对保险市场可能采取的公共政策措施的影响。