This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and insurers' risk and performance before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis. Monitoring institutional investors are defined as those that have (a) a long‐term investment horizon, (b) large holdings in the investee firm, (c) independence from management, and (d) a large portion of their portfolio invested in the firm. We measure both the level and persistence of monitoring institutional ownership and find a negative relationship between monitoring institutional ownership and an insurer's stock stability and performance during the crisis. Further examination reveals that these firms took more risk before the crisis. Whereas many monitoring institutions exited the insurance market after the crisis, evidence suggests that the remaining institutional investors in the postcrisis period have a longer investment horizon and are active in monitoring and risk management.

中文翻译：

---

保险公司在2008年金融危机之前，之中和之后的风险和绩效：监督机构所有权的作用

这项研究研究了机构所有权与保险公司的风险与绩效之间的关系，该关系在2008年金融危机之前，之中和之后都存在。监视机构投资者的定义是：（a）长期投资范围，（b）被投资公司的大量股权，（c）不受管理的独立性，以及（d）他们的投资组合中有很大一部分投资于该公司的投资者。我们衡量了监控机构所有权的水平和持久性，并发现在危机期间监控机构所有权与保险公司的股票稳定性和绩效之间存在负相关关系。进一步的检查表明，这些公司在危机发生前承担了更多的风险。危机过后，许多监管机构退出了保险市场，