Research shows that electronic monitoring technologies can reduce illicit agent (e.g., frontline worker) behavior along monitored dimensions such that principals (e.g., firms) benefit. Drawing on theory from criminology regarding the concept of offense displacement, we explain why the benefits from increased monitoring may be mitigated if agents subsequently increase other types of illicit acts not subject to greater monitoring. We investigate this possibility by examining how a mandate requiring millions of truck drivers to adopt electronic logging devices to record their working hours affected different safety behaviors and outcomes. Using data from millions of driver inspections and crash counts before and after the mandate and a differences‐in‐differences identification strategy, we find greater monitoring due to the mandate achieved its first‐order effect of reducing the frequency that drivers were in non‐compliance with work hour rules (the monitored dimension). However, drivers for small firms that were most affected by the mandate also appear to have increased their frequency of unsafe driving (e.g., speeding). We also find that crash counts for small firms did not fall relative to large firms, and may have increased. These results call into question whether increased electronic monitoring has improved safety in this industry.

中文翻译：

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对IT启用的监视的意外响应：电子记录设备授权的情况

研究表明，电子监控技术可以在受监控的范围内减少违法行为者（例如，前线工人）的行为，从而使委托人（例如，公司）受益。我们从犯罪学的犯罪转移概念的理论出发，我们解释了为什么如果侦探随后增加其他不受更严格监督的非法行为，增加监督的好处可能会被削弱。我们通过检查一项要求数百万卡车驾驶员采用电子记录设备来记录其工作时间的命令，如何影响不同的安全行为和结果来研究这种可能性。利用任务执行前后数以百万计的驾驶员检查和碰撞计数中的数据以及差异识别策略，我们发现，由于授权达到了其第一级的效果，即减少了驾驶员不遵守工作时间规则（被监控的维度）的频率，因此可以进行更好的监控。但是，受任务影响最大的小公司的驾驶员似乎也增加了不安全驾驶（例如超速驾驶）的频率。我们还发现，相对于大企业而言，小企业的崩溃次数并没有减少，反而可能有所增加。这些结果令人质疑，增加电子监控是否可以改善该行业的安全性。我们还发现，相对于大企业而言，小企业的崩溃次数并没有减少，反而可能有所增加。这些结果令人质疑，增加电子监控是否可以改善该行业的安全性。我们还发现，相对于大企业而言，小企业的崩溃次数并没有减少，反而可能有所增加。这些结果令人质疑，增加电子监控是否可以改善该行业的安全性。