We investigate the impact of using a clear scoring rule in a sealed bid multi‐dimensional (A+B) procurement auction, as frequently used in government procurement. The central procurement agency in Chile (ChileCompra) asked for help to understand how concealing the scoring rule affected buyers. Using an experiment, we analyze the effect of transparently communicating the scoring rule on bidding outcomes by comparing the buyer's surplus and supplier profits when buyers expressly communicate the weight they place on a nonmonetary (B) attribute, versus when this information is concealed from bidders. In addition, we compare outcomes where the scoring rule is made visible only after the offers are submitted. If the scoring rule is not disclosed, outcomes are poorer for buyers, and sellers see their profits increase.

中文翻译：

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透明性在采购中的作用：在密封式A + B竞标中公开或隐藏计分规则

我们调查在政府采购中经常使用的密封投标多维（A + B）采购拍卖中使用明确的评分规则的影响。智利中央采购机构（ChileCompra）寻求帮助，以了解隐瞒评分规则如何影响买家。通过实验，我们通过比较买方明确表达他们对非货币（B）属性的权重以及对投标人隐瞒此信息时的买方盈余和供应商利润，透明地传达评分规则对投标结果的影响。另外，我们比较仅在要约提交后才显示评分规则的结果。如果不披露评分规则，则买方的结果会较差，卖方会看到利润增加。