Awareness of this truth has progressed beyond the theoretical level. A significant body of scholarship has utilized robust empirical methods to show that judges are influenced by a whole range of factors (often, but not exclusively, ideological in nature), and that there are, at least in some cases, significant differences between the approaches of individual judges of a given court. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the hyper‐partisan nature of its Supreme Court, the greatest volume of scholarship in this regard comes from the United States. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, we have generally been far less attuned to this sort of research.

Rachel Cahill‐O'Callaghan's Values in the Supreme Court is one of the most important and refreshing exceptions to this trend, joining the small but increasingly impressive list of works which employ empirical methods in order to analyse how our own courts work in practice. Her aim is to challenge the ‘myth of objectivity and impartiality’ (Prologue) of the United Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC), and to unpack the ‘unseen diversity’ of the judicial minds therein (p. 127). In this, I am happy to say, she undoubtedly succeeds.

Rather than relying on party politics or vague notions of ideology, the author instead focuses on values. Drawing heavily on the work of social psychologist Shalom Schwartz, she proposes that all decision making is ‘anchored’ in the personal values we hold (p. 10; p. 12). In particular, it is suggested that all decision makers rely on a mixture of ‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’ reasoning. When forced to make a judgment, we first engage our system 1 reasoning, whereby our intimately held values are automatically and instinctively followed. This is then moderated by system 2 reasoning, which is more deliberative and conscious; a whole host of factors can either buttress or cause us to move away from our original value‐driven inclinations. There are, in Schwartz's account, ten such values, some of the most prevalent in the judicial context being self‐direction, power, security, conformity, tradition, and universalism.

The application of this model to the judicial role is obvious. When seeking to answer a legal question, the judge will intuitively reach towards an answer that is guided by their personal values (system 1 reasoning), but once system 2 reasoning is engaged, various legal (and many other) influences arise: the arguments of the parties, the words of applicable statutes, the existence or otherwise of precedent, and so on. The pertinent question, then, is whether the considerations that influence system 2 reasoning completely extinguish the possibility for the application of values in the decision‐making process. According to Cahill‐O'Callaghan, this is not the case, and we can – and do – find evidence of these individual values in (at least some) of the UKSC's judgments.

Methodology is important in legal empirical work, and the author wisely dedicates a chapter to justifying her methods and explaining them clearly. Whilst much of the existing literature on judicial behaviour focuses on the outcome of judgments, Cahill‐O'Callaghan instead employs content analysis to the text of judgments. Thus, each UKSC judgment is combed for certain terms, phrases, or expressions relating to Schwartz's ten values. Values in the Supreme Court is not a strict work of political science, but its methods appear robust and sensible. As a reader who is interested in empirical research but not a political scientist, I am also thankful that the use of unnecessary jargon was kept to a minimum. However, although it is accepted that much empirical work will involve personal assessment to some degree and thus an unavoidable element of subjectivity (pp. 39–41), it would nonetheless have been useful to have been told a little more about how the ‘systematic, rule‐guided content analysis’ (p. 71) was applied in practice, especially since the author's methods are somewhat unusual even within the narrow field of empirical legal research.

In terms of the sorts of cases analysed, the author, careful not to overstate the influence of values on legal decision making, chooses to focus on what she terms ‘uncertain decisions’ (p. 3) – those decisions in which the law is more ambiguous and where values may have a stronger role. Whilst accepting that all cases at the UKSC are in one sense hard cases (p. 28), the author draws quite a sharp distinction between unanimous cases on the one hand and split cases on the other. Whilst it is not said – at least explicitly – that values play no part in the decision‐making process in unanimous cases, the occasional intimation that values do not feature in all cases (see, for example, p. 70) suggests that this may be Cahill‐O'Callaghan's view. Whilst that is certainly a contestable position, it at least makes sense to focus primarily on split cases for practical purposes.

Having made her case for the importance of values in legal decision making and the methodology to be adopted, the author moves to the central focus of the project: how personal values operate in practice. This begins in Chapter 3 with a close reading of the famous Jewish Free School case.33 R (E) v. Governing Body of JFS [2009] UKSC 15. In many ways, the case is an ideal candidate for content analysis, as it raises a number of important considerations, any number of which may engage one's deeply held values, including the rights of religious minorities, the importance of equality in education, the freedom and autonomy of non‐state institutions, and the weight of local, national, and European decision making. As it happens, the values expressed in the JFS case mainly align with archetypes of universalism and traditionalism; seeing just how different the emphasis is between the majority and minority blocs is both interesting and quite striking. In addition, focusing on one single case in this chapter also allows for an uninitiated reader to get a real feel for the sort of work that content analysis puts in here; the author's conclusions in this respect feel both satisfying and, ultimately, convincing. That being the case, a section in this chapter detailing an experiment involving an ‘expert survey’ in order to further prove the value:decision paradigm felt somewhat otiose.

Chapter 4 turns to an examination of the role of values in split decisions and, using a sample of non‐unanimous cases decided by the UKSC over the course of its first decade, shows that majority and minority speeches in such cases are often guided by different – sometimes competing – values. This chapter is really fascinating, confirming not only the main hypothesis of the book as a whole – that values can influence the outcome of cases – but also that a judge's values may play a part in determining whether to author a dissenting judgment, or how far they engage with the substance of the speeches of other judges.

Chapters 5 and 6 examine the values held by the individual judges of the UKSC. This constitutes the most interesting part of the book, and features the author's most impressive findings. Put simply, it seems to be the case that not only do judges draw upon values in the decision‐making process, but that individual judges are guided by different values. Some of the judges’ profiles here make sense to those familiar with their judgments; few readers will be surprised to find Lord Kerr described as the UKSC's chief ‘universalist’ and that Lord Brown and Lord Rodger fall into the category of ‘traditionalists’. On the other hand, the values expressed by others, such as Lord Toulson, are somewhat more surprising. Overall, the author succeeds at showing that whilst there may be little consistency in terms of the case outcomes that they reach, there is seemingly a significant degree of consistency in terms of the values that underpin each individual judge's thinking. This is hugely significant, and underlines the importance of considering who our judges are and which values they hold. With these chapters in particular, the idea that values play a part in decision making moves from something that is theoretically interesting to consider to something that is vitally important to acknowledge: personal values directly influence case outcomes and the development of the law. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this finding; Cahill‐O'Callaghan is modest in outlining the significance of her conclusions, but this is absolutely unwarranted.

There is just one aspect of this analysis which this reviewer finds unconvincing: the author's reliance on extra‐judicial speeches. The author argues that whilst some judges express the same values across the board, in both their judicial and their extra‐judicial outputs, others do not. In particular, Lord Phillips (pp. 142–145) and Lord Neuberger (pp. 145–146) are charged with expressing certain values outside the UKSC but pivoting to different values in their official judicial role. The author confesses that it is ‘difficult to speculate’ as to why this may be the case (p. 146), although it is suggested that some judges may be guided far less strongly by their values and sit instead at the ‘deliberative end of the scale’ (p. 145). Whilst this explanation makes sense, it is here that the author comes up against what is perhaps the most significant challenge for anyone working on a work like this: the difficulty of identifying the individual preferences of judges (whether it be in terms of politics, ideology, values, or anything else) in the abstract. Usually, in the absence of explicit political statements or appointments, these must be inferred, often working backwards from the judgments themselves. Throughout the book, the author does this masterfully, parsing the judges’ values from the text of their judgments. In Chapters 5 and 6, however, the author uses extra‐judicial speeches as an additional source of judicial values. With respect, although it is certainly an interesting idea, I am more sceptical than the author that such speeches are particularly helpful in this regard. Extra‐judicial speeches are probably just too different in nature to be usefully compared with judgments.44 It should be noted, however, that my scepticism is not shared by the empirical legal community; consideration of extra‐judicial speeches features in a number of works such as R. Hunter and E. Rackley, ‘Judicial Leadership on the UK Supreme Court’ (2018) 38 Legal Studies 191; J. Lee, ‘The Judicial Individuality of Lord Sumption’ (2017) 31 UNSW Law J. 862; J. A. G. Griffith, ‘The Brave New World of Sir John Laws’ (2000) 63 Modern Law Rev. 159, at 159–160. They are often written (frequently with considerable input from judicial assistants) for a specific audience, are usually given in response to an invitation from a specific group or organization, and tend to be drafted with a specific purpose in mind. Particularly in the case of speeches from more prominent judicial figures, they may serve to represent and promote the UKSC as an institution, rather than to reflect the views of the individual speaker. It is therefore not too surprising to find that the values expressed in the extra‐judicial speeches of Lord Neuberger and Lord Phillips differ from those expressed in their judgments, although I doubt that this is because those speeches reflect the ‘true’ expressions of judicial values.

Some slight misgivings notwithstanding, it goes without saying that this is absolutely fascinating and important work, and Cahill‐O'Callaghan should be enthusiastically commended for producing it. She takes complex subjects spanning multiple different disciplines – psychology, political science, and law – and turns them into a digestible and illuminating read. Not only does her book argue her central thesis well, but it also features a number of observations and asides that are interesting in their own right, such as that explicit expressions of values in judgments seem to be decreasing over time (p. 77) and that clashes of values are more likely to arise under certain Court Presidents (pp. 118–121). Interesting, too, is the fact that certain judges tend to show more value ‘markers’ than others (pp. 125–126). This particular observation is not really elaborated upon further, but it raises a number of questions. Why is that the case? Is it because certain judges decide more straightforward cases in which their values are less likely to seep through? Do some judges ‘go with their gut’ more than others? Is it because certain judges are able to put their predilections to one side and allow themselves to be guided solely by the law?

Digging deeper, we might also ask whether it could be the case that some judges are intentionally far less candid in terms of the role that their internal values play in their reasoning, not because they are superhuman and able to ignore their personal values, but due to a feeling that value‐based reasoning should remain hidden. After all, it is in the judges’ interests to present their reasoning in a detached and impersonal manner. This helps to protect them from the very charges that the author and others have made: that they are judging according to their own values, rather according to the law. Detached reasoning provides an opportunity to disguise their more personal approach underneath a veneer of objectivity.55 R. Kirkham, ‘JR55, Judicial Strategy and the Limits of Textual Reasoning’ (2017) Public Law 46, at 55; more broadly, K. Bybee, All Judges Are Political Except When They Are Not (2010). Notwithstanding the impossibility of a totally objective approach to the law (a myth that Values in the Supreme Court thoroughly dismantles), it makes sense for judges to continue to read from the script that says that their deeply held values are completely irrelevant.66 R. Hunter et al., ‘Judging in Lower Courts: Conventional, Procedural, Therapeutic and Feminist Approaches’ (2016) 12 International J. of Law in Context 337, at 340–342; T. Maroney, ‘The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion’ (2011) 99 California Law Rev. 629.

These sorts of issues appear only in the background of Values in the Supreme Court. We are told, for example, that the findings raise ‘[i]mportant questions’ (p. 172) and have ‘significant implications’ (p. 173), which is true. However, whilst the author briefly mentions judicial diversity (pp. 179–180), judicial appointments (pp. 180–181), panel selection (pp. 172–175), and the important issue of public legitimacy (pp. 150–154), the larger questions – how should we view the role of judges, should their values play a role in their appointment, and can the legitimacy of the UKSC survive attacks on its objectivity? – go unanswered. Of course, tackling these questions is not Cahill‐O'Callaghan's goal, and she certainly covers enough ground in this book without having to answer them definitively. Resolving the tension between the judicial role and judicial reality can wait for another day, and a full and frank discussion of that issue could really fill a book by itself. But even in the absence of some neat and tidy solution, and especially given how convincingly the author is able to dismantle the presumptions that we hold about the judicial role, this reviewer would certainly have enjoyed hearing a little more on where the author believes we should go from here.

It is true that ‘a judge personifies the very majesty of the law’.77 C. Davies, ‘Judges and Humour in Britain: From Anecdotes to Jokes’ in Judges, Judging and Humour, ed. J. Davis and S. Anleu (2018) 42. That being the case, it is somewhat surprising that in the United Kingdom we are only just beginning to question the way in which our judges behave, both as individuals and as part of the collective court. Despite increasing scepticism over the idea of judicial exceptionalism, the judiciary continues to promote the caricature of the objective and dispassionate arbiter; the judge must seemingly be, in Lord Neuberger's words, ‘detached, almost Olympian’88 D. Neuberger and P. Riddell, The Power of Judges (2018) 22. to be authoritative. Naturally, evidence of the significant influence that personal values have on decision making could be used to argue for a significantly reduced role for the judiciary. It is possible – if reductive – to use this sort of work to raise the charge that judges act in a political way (a buzzword which is, rightly, very carefully avoided by Cahill‐O'Callaghan herself). However, drawing upon values in hard cases is a world away from wantonly judging according to partisan politics. The relevance of personal values, being neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad in and of themselves, may not invalidate judicial authority, although it might require a re‐conceptualization of judicial independence and impartiality. After all, even J. A. G. Griffith thought that although a judge cannot be expected to act neutrally, they may still be best suited to making certain decisions.99 J. A. G. Griffith, Politics of the Judiciary (1997, 5^th edn) 57. In any case, it seems that drawing upon personal values is an inescapable aspect of any decision‐making process, albeit usually an unarticulated one. If this is the case, the real question becomes how useful the perpetuation of the myth of absolute neutrality continues to be. Being open and honest about this may be better than stubbornly staying in denial, but in truth we may not be ready to open Pandora's box just yet.

对这一真理的认识已经超出了理论水平。大量的学术研究已经使用了可靠的经验方法来表明法官受到各种因素的影响（通常但并非排他性地影响意识形态），并且至少在某些情况下，两种方法之间存在显着差异特定法院法官的人数。鉴于其最高法院具有超党​​派性质，也许这不足为奇，在这方面，最大的奖学金来自美国。相比之下，在英国，我们通常对这种研究不太了解。

雷切尔·卡希尔·奥卡拉汉（Rachel Cahill-O'Callaghan）在最高法院的价值观是这一趋势中最重要，最令人耳目一新的例外，它加入了少量但越来越令人印象深刻的作品，这些作品采用经验方法来分析我们自己的法院在实践中的运作方式。她的目标是挑战英国最高法院（UKSC）的“客观和公正神话”（序言），并解开其中的司法思想的“看不见的多样性”（第127页）。在此，我很高兴地说，她无疑是成功的。

作者不是依靠党派政治或模糊的意识形态概念，而是着重于价值观。她大量借鉴了社会心理学家Shalom Schwartz的工作，她建议所有决策都“固守”在我们持有的个人价值观中（第10页；第12页）。特别是，建议所有决策者都依赖于“系统1”和“系统2”推理的混合。当被迫做出判断时，我们首先要进行系统1的推理，从而自动并本能地遵循我们的内在价值。然后，通过系统2的推理来缓和这一点，该系统的审议和意识更强。各种各样的因素可能会支持或导致我们摆脱最初的价值驱动型倾向。在施瓦茨（Schwartz）的论述中，有十种这样的价值观，在司法环境中最普遍的一些价值观是自我指导，权力，安全，顺从，传统和普遍主义。

该模型在司法角色中的应用是显而易见的。寻求回答法律问题时，法官会直观地寻求以其个人价值观为指导的答案（系统1的推理），但是一旦采用系统2的推理，就会产生各种法律（以及许多其他）影响：各方，适用法规的用语，先例是否存在等。那么，一个相关的问题是，影响系统2推理的考虑因素是否完全消除了在决策过程中应用价值的可能性。根据卡希尔·奥卡拉汉（Cahill-O'Callaghan）的说法，情况并非如此，我们可以（而且确实）在UKSC的判决中（至少某些）找到这些个体价值的证据。

方法论在法律实证研究中很重要，作者明智地专门用一章来说明她的方法并清楚地解释它们。尽管有关司法行为的现有文献大多集中在判决结果上，但Cahill-O'Callaghan却对判决文本采用了内容分析。因此，每个UKSC判断都结合了与Schwartz十个值相关的某些术语，短语或表达方式。最高法院的价值观这不是政治学的严格著作，但其方法显得健壮而明智。作为对实证研究感兴趣但对政治学家不感兴趣的读者，我也很感谢将不必要的行话降至最低。但是，尽管已经接受了很多实证研究都将在一定程度上涉及个人评估，因此不可避免地会出现主观性的问题（第39-41页），但是，如果被告知更多关于“系统的，在实践中应用了规则指导的内容分析”（第71页），特别是因为即使在实证法律研究的狭窄领域内，作者的方法也有些不寻常。

就所分析的案件类型而言，作者小心翼翼，不要过分强调价值观对法律决策的影响，而是选择专注于她所说的“不确定决策”（第3页），即那些法律更多的决策。模棱两可，价值可能在其中发挥更大作用。在接受UKSC的所有案件在某种意义上来说都是艰难的案件（第28页）的同时，作者在一方面的一致案件与另一方面的分裂案件之间做出了很大的区分。尽管没有（至少明确地）说过，在一致的情况下价值观在决策过程中不起作用，但偶尔有人暗示价值观并非在所有情况下都具有特征（例如，参见第70页），这表明可能是卡希尔·奥卡拉汉（Cahill‐O'Callaghan）的观点。虽然这无疑是一个有争议的立场，

在论证了价值在法律决策和采用的方法中的重要性之后，作者转向了该项目的中心重点：个人价值在实践中的运作方式。从第三章开始，仔细阅读著名的犹太自由学校案例。33 R（E）诉JFS管理机构[2009] UKSC 15。在许多方面，此案是进行内容分析的理想人选，因为它提出了许多重要的考虑因素，其中任何一个因素都可能涉及一个人的深层价值观，包括宗教少数群体的权利，教育平等的重要性，自由非国家机构的自治权，以及地方，国家和欧洲决策的权重。碰巧的是，在JFS案例中表达的价值主要符合普遍主义和传统主义的原型。看到多数派和少数派之间的关注点有多么不同既有趣又引人注目。另外，在本章中只关注一个案例，这也使初学者可以真正了解内容分析所要进行的工作。作者' 在这方面的结论令人感到满意，并最终令人信服。在这种情况下，本章的一节详细介绍了一个涉及“专家调查”的实验，以进一步证明其价值：决策范式显得有些琐碎。

第4章探讨了价值观在分裂决策中的作用，并使用了UKSC在其最初十年中决定的非一致案例的样本，表明在此类案例中的多数和少数派讲话通常是由不同的指导–有时是竞争–价值观。这一章确实令人着迷，不仅确认了本书的主要假设-价值可以影响案件的结果-而且还可以证明法官的价值可以在确定是否做出不同意见或在多大程度上发挥作用。他们参与其他法官的演讲内容。

第5章和第6章研究了UKSC个别法官的价值观。这是本书中最有趣的部分，并且具有作者最令人印象深刻的发现。简而言之，似乎不仅法官在决策过程中利用价值，而且个别法官受​​不同价值指导。对于熟悉判断的人来说，这里有些法官的简介是有意义的。很少有读者会惊讶地发现克尔勋爵被描述为UKSC的首席“普世主义者”，而布朗勋爵和罗杰勋爵属于“传统主义者”。另一方面，其他人（例如图尔森勋爵）所表达的价值观则有些令人惊讶。总体而言，作者成功地表明，尽管就案件达成的结果而言，可能并不一致，在每个法官的想法所依据的价值观方面，似乎存在着很大程度的一致性。这非常重要，并强调了考虑我们的法官是谁以及他们拥有哪些价值的重要性。特别是在这些章节中，价值在决策中起作用的想法已从理论上值得考虑的事物转变为至关重要的事物：个人价值观直接影响案件的结果和法律的发展。很难夸大这一发现的重要性。卡希尔·奥卡拉汉（Cahill-O'Callaghan）在总结其结论的意义时谦虚，但这绝对是没有根据的。

审阅者认为这种分析的一个方面是不令人信服的：作者对法外言论的依赖。作者认为，尽管有些法官在司法和法外输出中全面表达了相同的价值观，但其他法官却没有。特别是，菲利普斯勋爵（pp。142–145）和诺伊贝格勋爵（pp。145–146）负责在UKSC之外表达某些价值观，但在其正式司法角色中转向不同的价值观。作者承认，为什么会出现这种情况“很难推测”（第146页），尽管有人建议，某些法官可能会受到其价值观的指导作用不强，而坐在“审慎”的位置。标尺”（第145页）。尽管这种解释是有道理的，在这里，作者面临着对于任何从事此类工作的人来说可能是最重大的挑战：难以确定法官的个人喜好（无论是从政治，意识形态，价值观还是其他方面来看） ）中的摘要。通常，在没有明确的政治声明或任命的情况下，必须推断出这些声明或任命，通常是背离判决本身。在整本书中，作者都​​是熟练地做到这一点，从判决文本中解析出法官的价值观。但是，在第5章和第6章中，作者将司法以外的言论用作司法价值的附加来源。对此，尽管这肯定是一个有趣的想法，但我比作者更怀疑这些演讲在这方面特别有帮助。4但是，应该指出的是，经验主义法律界并不认同我的怀疑。R.Hunter和E.Rackley等作品在《英国最高法院的司法领导权》（2018年）第38期《法律研究》第191页; J.李，“Sumption主的司法个性”（2017）31新南威尔士大学法Ĵ。862; JAG格里菲斯，（2000）63“约翰爵士法律的美丽新世界”现代法学版本。159，在159-160。它们通常是为特定受众编写的（通常是在司法助理的大量投入下），通常是根据特定团体或组织的邀请而给出的，并且往往出于特定目的而起草。特别是在来自比较著名的司法界人士的演讲中，它们可能起到代表和促进UKSC作为一个机构的作用，而不是反映单个发言人的观点。因此，发现诺伊贝格勋爵和菲利普斯勋爵的法外演说所表达的价值观与他们的判决中所表达的价值观有所不同，这并不奇怪，尽管我对此表示怀疑，因为这些言辞反映了司法价值的“真实”表达。

尽管有些许疑虑，但毋庸置疑，这绝对是一件引人入胜的重要工作，因此，Cahill-O'Callaghan的创作受到了热烈的赞扬。她修读了涉及多个不同学科（心理学，政治学和法学）的复杂主题，并将其转变为易于理解和启发性的读物。她的书不仅论证了她的中心论点，而且还具有许多本身很有趣的观察和观点，例如，随着时间的流逝，判断中价值观的明确表达似乎正在减少（第77页），并且在某些法院院长的领导下更可能发生价值冲突（第118-121页）。同样有趣的是，某些法官倾向于表现出比其他法官更多的价值“标志”（第125-126页）。对该特定观察未做进一步详细阐述，但提出了许多问题。为什么会这样？是因为某些法官决定了更直接的案例，在这些案例中其价值不太可能渗透？是否有一些法官比其他人更“善解人意”？是否因为某些法官能够将自己的偏见放到一边，并让他们自己完全受到法律的指导？

深入研究，我们还可能会问，是否有可能某些法官故意在其内部价值观在推理中所扮演的角色方面坦率地坦率，不是因为他们超人并且能够忽略其个人价值观，而是由于认为应该隐藏基于价值的推理。毕竟，以独立和非个人化的方式陈述其推理符合法官的利益。这有助于保护他们免受作者和其他人提出的指控：他们是在根据自己的价值观而不是根据法律进行审判。缺乏理性的推理提供了一个机会，可以掩盖客观性，掩盖他们更为个人化的态度。55 R.Kirkham，``JR55，司法策略和文本推理的局限性''（2017年），《公共法》第46期，第55页; 更广泛地讲，K。Bybee，《除不是时的所有法官都具有政治性》（2010年）。尽管不可能采取完全客观的法律方法（最高法院的价值观彻底消除了这个神话），但法官仍应继续阅读剧本，认为其根深蒂固的价值观是完全不相关的。66 R. Hunter等人，“在低级法院进行审判：传统，程序，治疗和女性主义方法”（2016年），《国际法学杂志》背景337，第340-342页；马洛尼（T. Maroney），“司法不懈的持久文化脚本”（2011年），第99号加利福尼亚法律。629。

这些问题仅出现在最高法院的价值观背景下。例如，我们被告知，这些发现提出了“重要问题”（第172页），并具有“重大意义”（第173页），这是事实。然而，尽管作者简要提到了司法多样性（第179-180页），司法任命（第180-181页），专家组selection选（第172-175页）以及公共合法性的重要问题（第150-154页） ），更大的问题是-我们应该如何看待法官的角色，他们的价值观应在任命中发挥作用，并且UKSC的合法性能否幸免于其客观性的攻击？–无人接听。当然，解决这些问题不是Cahill-O'Callaghan的目标，并且她当然在本书中涵盖了足够的内容，而不必最终回答。解决司法角色与司法现实之间的紧张关系可以等待另一天，对此问题进行全面而坦率的讨论实际上可以单独完成一本书。但是，即使在没有任何整洁的解决方案的情况下，尤其是考虑到作者能够令人信服地撤消我们对司法角色的假设，这位审稿人当然也乐于听取更多关于作者认为我们应该在哪里进行的了解。从这里走。

的确，“法官体现了法律的威严”。77 C. Davies，“英国的法官和幽默：从轶事到笑话”，《法官，审判和幽默》，编辑。戴维斯（J.Davis）和安莱（S.Anleu）（2018）42。在这种情况下，令人惊讶的是，在英国，我们才刚刚开始质疑我们的法官作为个人和作为集体法院一部分的行为方式。尽管人们对司法例外论的观念越来越怀疑，但司法机构仍在继续宣传客观和冷漠的仲裁人的讽刺意味；用Neuberger勋爵的话来说，法官似乎一定是“独立的，几乎是奥林匹亚的人” 88 D.Neuberger和P.Riddell，《法官的力量》（2018年）22。权威。自然地，个人价值观对决策产生重大影响的证据可以用来证明司法机构的作用显着降低。如果可以简化的话，有可能利用这种工作来提高法官在政治上的行为的指控。方式（一个流行语，Cahill-O'Callaghan本来应该非常小心地避免）。但是，在困难的情况下利用价值是一个远离党派政治肆意判断的世界。个人价值观的相关性，既不是内在的好坏，也不是本质上的坏处，虽然可能要求对司法独立性和公正性进行重新概念化，但可能不会使司法权威无效。毕竟，甚至JAG Griffith都认为，尽管不能指望法官采取中立的行动，但他们可能仍然最适合做出某些决定。99 JAG Griffith，《司法制度》（1997年，^第5版）57。无论如何，利用个人价值似乎是任何决策过程中不可避免的方面，尽管通常这是没有明确规定的。如果真是这样，那么真正的问题就变成了绝对中立的神话继续存在的有用性。坦诚面对这一点可能比固执地拒绝接受要好，但是实际上我们可能还没有准备好打开潘多拉盒子。