I will return below to Naffine's claim about criminal law being concerned primarily with male behaviour so as to concentrate in the first instance on the key contribution of the book in illuminating the evolving doctrinal and ideological mechanisms through which the sex of the legal subject has been at first explicitly asserted and then gradually obfuscated. At the heart of her analysis are criminal law's arrangements for the liability of husbands, and commentators’ rationalizations of those arrangements. This focus on legal statements about men as husbands is necessary, she argues, because ‘men, as men, only come clearly into view when they are defined in relation to women. Logically, it is the other sex, that which men are not, which sets the boundaries and the contours of men's nature’ (p. 42). Of course, this focus puts the history of the marital rape exemption – alongside the doctrine of coverture, the defence of provocation, and the doctrine of the unity of husband and wife – at the core of the interpretive project.

I confess that my first reaction to this was that it might be difficult to ground a general critique of criminal law and criminal lawyers on such relatively specific grounds. However, I in fact found Naffine's analysis persuasive. In effect, she convicts both criminal law and criminal law commentators – right up to the present day – of rank hypocrisy. On the one hand, rape is universally held up to represent a paradigm offence at the most serious ‘core’ of criminal law; on the other, this allegedly horrific crime was, right up until the late twentieth century, magically erased by the mere fact of marriage. Many of the iconic figures of criminal law scholarship in the common law world are the objects of Naffine's critique: Matthew Hale, James Fitzjames Stephen, Glanville Williams, Tony Honoré, Norval Morris, and – of course – William Blackstone, who ‘set the tone of male hubris and condescension for the other sex, with his wry note that “so great a favourite” were women to the laws of England that most of their rights were stripped away from them upon marriage’ (p. 58). Only a few courageous thinkers – John Stuart Mill and Edward Christian key among them – have been willing to call out the law's hypocrisy and collusion in men's unjust domination of women. On the whole, ‘Our men of legal influence were in the grip of incompatible ideas’ (p. 107): that the wrongs and harms identified as criminal would be pursued by the law without prejudice; yet that the status of maleness accorded immunity in relation to some of those most serious wrongs when committed against women.

Perhaps most telling for the contemporary reader is Naffine's coruscating critique of the terms in which the marital rape exemption was finally abolished in many common law jurisdictions in the late twentieth century. The various stepping stones on the way to abolition – notably the quite extraordinary period in South Australia during which the exemption was abolished in cases involving humiliation or violence, as if any rape could avoid such features – were themselves shameful, and the evasive way in which full abolition was finally secured simply failed to notice that a fundamental change in the status of men was being effected. Rather, this revolutionary moment was presented as one small step in a gradual process of modernization by which women have been drawn out of the ‘primeval female slime’ of reduced status (p. 126), in a (moderately) embarrassingly belated instance of the law catching up with social mores: ‘With its single‐minded focus on the incapacities of women, R v R implicitly treated men as liberal subjects all along, their status as men essentially unchanged by these amendments to the law of rape’ (p. 210). In this context, Naffine draws a striking contrast between the acknowledgement that, in effect, the law had colluded in the victimization of married women by legitimizing marital rape for centuries, and parallels such as former Prime Minister Gordon Brown's posthumous apology to Alan Turing, let alone phenomena such as the Nuremberg Trials or Truth and Reconciliation Commissions following instances of genocide or other forms of racially based oppression.

Law's arrangements, in other words, were inconsistent with men attaining standing as a liberal individual – a further form of institutional hypocrisy, or perhaps self‐deception.

In this context, Naffine also notes the irony that the emergence of impartiality and neutrality in legal theory has gone hand in hand with the insight, across the social sciences, humanities, and even the ‘hard’ sciences, that the analyst's gaze and social position shape the construction of knowledge (p. 131). Until the ‘man problem’ is much more widely recognized across in criminal law practice and scholarship, and the insights of Jennifer Nedelsky's and other feminist theorists’ work on the relational nature of subjectivity and human being11 See, for example: J. Nedelsky,Law's Relations: A Relationship Theory of Self, Autonomy and Law(2011); S. Benhabib,Situating the Self(1992); D. Tietjen Meyers (ed.),Feminists Rethink the Self(1996). taken fully on board, Naffine concludes that criminal legal discourse will be fundamentally distorted by its internal contradictions and moral incoherence, achieving a mere ‘deeming’ of the inclusion of women (or indeed of any realistically embodied human beings). The upshot is that the vaunted idea of criminal law's contribution to peaceable and respectful civil society remains radically incomplete.

Naffine's book is an eloquent testimony to the illuminating power and critical potential of a historical analysis of legal arrangements and the terms in which they have been justified. In a precedential, common law system, each decision and development proceeds in some sense by reference to the past, and Naffine's comprehensive survey of the treatment of the marital rape exemption and other features of criminal law's empowerment of men at the expense of women shows how the field has been polluted by the uncritical reception of the legacies of its luminary‐patriarchs. She is able to show that the assumptions underlying the purportedly archaic arrangements have yet to be thoroughly exposed and revised. This is painstaking work, against the grain of both contemporary academic discourse and prevailing legal ideology; but it is work on which Naffine makes decisive progress. Certainly, as some critics may complain, many of the influential scholars whose slowness in acknowledging the outrage of the marital rape exemptions had impeccable liberal credentials in many areas. However, this simply serves to underline the shocking contrast between their sensibilities about other forms of oppression and those bearing centrally not just on women's physical and emotional safety but also on the status of men.

A trickier issue from my point of view has to do with Naffine's argument about the centrality of criminal law's concern with men's ‘antisocial behaviour’: the claim that criminal law has a ‘man problem’ not merely in terms of its implicit assumptions about ‘full’ or ‘normal’ personhood, but in terms of the fundamental problems that it addresses. In this context, she cites artist and cultural commentator Grayson Perry's (perhaps tongue‐in‐cheek) argument that women should be claiming a tax credit to compensate for the fact that by far the largest part of the cost of criminal justice is occasioned by men.22 G. Perry, The Descent of Man (2016). Certainly, both certain forms of female victimization and the striking, and strikingly persistent and pervasive, male‐gendered pattern of criminalization call for our critical attention. As I began to draft this review, the Femicide survey for 2018 revealed that 149 women were killed by men in the United Kingdom, 61 per cent of them by a former partner – a statistic that reflects the continuing shadow of the marital rape exemption. Of the 58 women not killed by a current or former partner, 17 were killed by their sons, sons‐in‐law, former sons‐in‐law, or stepsons. Notwithstanding a significant political and policy focus on domestic abuse in the United Kingdom in recent years, these figures represented an increase on the previous year.

Such figures undoubtedly invite the diagnosis of a ‘man problem’ in criminal law. However, of course, they represent a small fraction of the behaviour formally labelled as crime, and a yet smaller fraction of that which might be so labelled. Furthermore, as the sociological and critical criminologies of the latter part of the twentieth century have shown so clearly, a range of vectors of power are implicated not merely in shaping how the criminal law defines offending behaviour, but – equally if not more important – how those definitions are interpreted and implied in enforcement practice. This does not detract from criminal law's ‘man problem’ as Naffine mainly defines it. However, it reminds us that criminalization raises a range of problematic questions of justice. It implies, for example, a race/ethnicity problem, a class problem, and a heteronormative problem, each of which calls for a similarly thorough critical analysis. Such an analysis will also need to deal with the interaction between different strands of prejudice, power, and structurally mandated ignorance.

At first sight, the recent emergence in countries like the United Kingdom of an array of mentalities and social practices resistant to the sex/gender binary might be thought to subvert any effort to pinpoint a ‘man problem’ in criminal law. However, once we understand – as Naffine helps us to do – that criminal law's constitution of male and female subject positions is at once real (an operation of power) and yet a fantasy (a set of ideas projected into human bodies under the gaze of the law), we can see that some of these new forms of gender‐binary resistance are even now calling forth reactions that re‐enact that binary and oppressive coding. Key examples are cases in which a young woman's presentation of herself to a sexual partner as male has been taken as an obvious case of a fundamental deception destroying consent: as self‐evidently a more important deception than, say, presenting oneself as a genuinely engaged partner as opposed to an undercover police officer. Naffine's analysis prompts us to ask whether this is a matter of protecting vulnerable victims or rather an impulse to punish women who appropriate the appendages of male power. The marital rape exemption may have been laid to rest; but, as Naffine shows, the challenge of constituting criminal law's subjects in ways conducive to gender inclusivity and social civility remains to be adequately confronted.

我将在下面再次回到纳菲恩关于刑事法主要与男性行为有关的主张，以便首先集中论述该书在阐明法律主体性别所处的不断发展的理论和意识形态机制方面的主要贡献。首先明确声明，然后逐渐模糊。她分析的核心是刑法对丈夫责任的安排，以及评论员对这些安排的合理化。她认为，有必要将法律作为男性的丈夫声明为丈夫，因为“男人作为男人，只有在定义了与妇女有关的内容时，才会清楚地看到他们。从逻辑上说，是男人没有的另一种性别决定了男人天性的界限和轮廓”（第42页）。当然，

我承认，对此我的第一反应是，可能很难基于这样相对特定的理由来对刑法和刑事律师进行一般性批评。但是，我实际上发现Naffine的分析具有说服力。实际上，她对刑法和刑法评论员均定罪，直至今天。一方面，普遍认为强奸是最严重的刑法“核心”所代表的一种范式犯罪。另一方面，直到二十世纪后期，这种所谓的恐怖罪行被婚姻这一事实事实所神奇地消除了。普通法界的许多刑法学界标志性人物都是纳菲恩批评的对象：马修·黑尔（Matthew Hale），詹姆斯·菲茨杰姆斯（James Fitzjames Stephen），格兰维尔·威廉姆斯（TlanHonoré），诺里·莫里斯（Norval Morris）当然是威廉·布莱克斯通（William Blackstone），他“定下了男性傲慢自大和对其他性别自尊心的基调，”他耐心地指出，英国法律对女性“非常喜欢”，以至于大部分权利都被剥夺了。他们结婚后”（第58页）。只有少数勇敢的思想家–约翰·斯图尔特·米尔（John Stuart Mill）和爱德华·克里斯蒂安（Edward Christian）在内—愿意指出法律对男人不公正地统治女人的虚伪和勾结。总体而言，“我们的法律影响者掌握着不相容的观念”（第107页）：被认定为犯罪的过失在法律上不会受到损害；然而，在针对妇女犯下的一些最严重的错误方面，男性地位赋予豁免权。带着他的w记，英国法律对妇女“最喜欢”，以至于她们的大部分权利在结婚后都被剥夺了（第58页）。只有少数勇敢的思想家–约翰·斯图尔特·米尔（John Stuart Mill）和爱德华·克里斯蒂安（Edward Christian）在内—愿意指出法律对男人不公正地统治女人的虚伪和勾结。总体而言，“我们的法律影响者掌握着不相容的观念”（第107页）：被认定为犯罪的过失在法律上不会受到损害；然而，在针对妇女犯下的一些最严重的错误方面，男性地位赋予豁免权。带着他的w记，英国法律对妇女“最喜欢”，以至于她们的大部分权利在结婚后都被剥夺了（第58页）。只有少数勇敢的思想家–约翰·斯图尔特·米尔（John Stuart Mill）和爱德华·克里斯蒂安（Edward Christian）在内—愿意指出法律在男人不公正地统治女人方面的虚伪和勾结。总体而言，“我们的法律影响者掌握着不相容的观念”（第107页）：被认定为犯罪的过失在法律上不会受到损害；然而，在针对妇女犯下的一些最严重的错误方面，男性地位赋予豁免权。只有少数勇敢的思想家–约翰·斯图尔特·米尔（John Stuart Mill）和爱德华·克里斯蒂安（Edward Christian）在内—愿意指出法律对男人不公正地统治女人的虚伪和勾结。总体而言，“我们的法律影响者掌握着不相容的观念”（第107页）：被认定为犯罪的过失在法律上不会受到损害；然而，在针对妇女犯下的一些最严重的错误方面，男性地位赋予豁免权。只有少数勇敢的思想家–约翰·斯图尔特·米尔（John Stuart Mill）和爱德华·克里斯蒂安（Edward Christian）在内—愿意指出法律对男人不公正地统治女人的虚伪和勾结。总体而言，“我们的法律影响者掌握着不相容的观念”（第107页）：被认定为犯罪的过失在法律上不会受到损害；然而，在针对妇女犯下的一些最严重的错误方面，男性地位赋予豁免权。法律将追究被认定为犯罪的过失和损害；然而，在针对妇女犯下的一些最严重的错误方面，男性地位赋予豁免权。法律将追究被认定为犯罪的过失和损害；然而，在针对妇女犯下的一些最严重的错误方面，男性地位赋予豁免权。

对于当代读者而言，也许最能说明问题的是纳芬对20世纪后期许多普通法司法管辖区最终废除了婚内强奸豁免条款的含蓄批评。废除死刑的各种垫脚石-尤其是在南澳大利亚州的一个非常特殊的时期，在此期间，在涉及屈辱或暴力的案件中免除了豁免，好像任何强奸都可以避免此类特征-本身都是可耻的，并且是回避方式最终确保完全废除死刑，只是没有注意到人们的地位正在发生根本变化。而是，这一革命性时刻是现代化逐步发展过程中的一小步，通过这一过程，妇女已从地位降低的“原始女性史莱姆”中脱身（第126页），R v R一直以来都隐含地将男人视为自由主体，而这些人对男人的地位在强奸法修正案中基本上没有改变（第210页）。在这种情况下，纳芬与以下事实形成了鲜明的对比：承认该法律实际上是通过使婚内强奸合法化几个世纪来使已婚妇女受害，而前任首相戈登·布朗（Gordon Brown）向艾伦·图灵（Alan Turing）道歉表示类似种族灭绝或其他基于种族的压迫事件之后，诸如纽伦堡审判或真相与和解委员会这样的单独现象。

换句话说，法律的安排与男子获得自由主义者身份不一致–制度伪善或自欺欺人的另一种形式。

在这种情况下，纳芬还指出，具有讽刺意味的是，法律理论中公正和中立的出现与社会科学，人文科学乃至“硬性”科学的见解齐头并进，分析师的目光和社会地位塑造知识的建构（第131页）。直到“人的问题”在刑法实践和学术界得到广泛认可之前，詹妮弗·内德尔斯基和其他女权理论家的工作就主观性与人的关系本质的见解11例如，见：J。Nedelsky，《法律的关系：关于自我，自治和法律的关系理论》（2011年）；本哈比卜（S. Benhabib），《自我的境遇》（Situating the Self，1992年）；D. Tietjen Meyers（主编），女权主义者重新思考自我（1996年）。Naffine充分考虑了这一点，得出的结论是，刑事法律话语将因其内部矛盾和道德上的不连贯而从根本上扭曲，从而实现对妇女（或实际上任何实际体现的人类）包容性的仅仅“认罪”。结果是，自吹自of的刑法对和平与尊重的公民社会作出贡献的想法仍然根本不完整。

Naffine的书很好地证明了对法律安排及其合理依据进行历史分析的启发力和关键潜力。在先例的普通法体系中，每项决定和发展都在一定程度上借鉴了过去，而纳夫恩（Naffine）对婚内强奸豁免的处理方式和刑法赋予男性以牺牲女性的力量为特征的全面调查显示了如何该领域因其杰出的祖先继承人的不加批判而受到污染。她能够表明，据称是过时安排的基本假设尚未被彻底揭露和修改。这是艰苦的工作，与当代学术话语和普遍的法律意识形态背道而驰；但是Naffine在这项工作上取得了决定性的进展。当然，正如一些批评家可能会抱怨的那样，许多有影响力的学者对承认婚内强奸豁免的愤怒反应迟钝，在许多领域都具有无可挑剔的自由主义资历。但是，这仅仅是为了强调他们对其他形式压迫的敏感性与不仅集中于妇女的人身和情感安全而且集中于男性地位的敏感性之间的惊人对比。

从我的角度来看，一个棘手的问题与纳芬关于刑法关注人的“反社会行为”的中心性的论点有关：主张刑法有一个“人的问题”的主张不仅仅在于其关于“充分”的隐含假设。或“正常”人格，但要解决其基本问题。在这种情况下，她援引艺术家和文化评论员格雷森·佩里（Grayson Perry）的论点（也许是舌头上的话），认为妇女应要求税收抵免，以弥补迄今为止最大的刑事司法费用是由男子造成的事实。 .22 G.Perry，《人的后裔》（2016）。当然，某些形式的女性受害以及打击性，打击性，持续性和普遍性的男性化刑事定罪模式都需要引起我们的高度重视。当我开始起草这份审查报告时，2018年的《杀害妇女行为》调查显示，英国有149名妇女被男子杀害，其中61％是由前伴侣杀死的。这一统计数字反映了免除婚内强奸的阴影。在没有被现任或前任伴侣杀害的58名妇女中，有17名被其儿子，女in，前女s或继子杀害。尽管近年来英国在政治和政策上非常重视家庭虐待，但这些数字比前一年有所增加。

这些数字无疑邀请了刑法中“人的问题”的诊断。但是，当然，它们只占被正式标记为犯罪的行为的一小部分，而占被如此标记的行为的一小部分。此外，正如二十世纪后半叶的社会学和批判性犯罪学如此清楚地表明，一系列权力载体不仅牵涉到塑造刑法如何定义犯罪行为，而且-如果不是更重要的话-同样重要这些定义在执法实践中得到解释和暗示。正如纳芬主要定义的那样，这并没有减损刑法的“人的问题”。但是，这提醒我们，将刑事定罪提出了一系列有问题的正义问题。例如，这意味着种族/民族问题，阶级问题，还有一个异规范问题，每个问题都需要进行类似的彻底的批判性分析。此类分析还需要处理偏见，权力和结构性强制性无知的不同部分之间的相互作用。

乍看起来，在英国等国家，最近出现了一系列抵制性别/性别二元性的心态和社会习俗，这可能会颠覆任何旨在查明刑法中“人为问题”的努力。但是，一旦我们理解了（通过纳芬帮助我们做到），刑法对男女主体职位的构成就既是真实的（一种权力的运作），又是一种幻想（在人类的注视下投射到人体中的一系列观念）法律），我们可以看到，其中一些新形式的性别二元抗拒性现在甚至引发了重新制定二元和压迫性编码的反应。关键例子是，一个年轻女子向男方介绍自己的性伴侣被视为明显的基本欺骗破坏了同意的明显案例：比起说自己是一个真正订婚的伴侣，而不是一个秘密的警察，这无疑是一个更重要的欺骗。Naffine的分析促使我们问这是保护脆弱的受害者的问题，还是冲动惩罚那些适合男性统治者的女性的冲动。可以免除婚姻强奸的规定；但是，正如纳芬所表明的那样，以有利于性别包容性和社会文明的方式来构成刑法主体的挑战仍然有待充分应对。的分析促使我们问这是保护脆弱的受害者的问题，还是冲动惩罚那些适合男性势力的女性的问题。可以免除婚姻强奸的规定；但是，正如纳芬所表明的那样，以有利于性别包容性和社会文明的方式来构成刑法主体的挑战仍然有待充分应对。的分析促使我们问这是保护脆弱的受害者的问题，还是冲动惩罚那些适合男性势力的女性的问题。可以免除婚姻强奸的规定；但是，正如纳芬所表明的那样，以有利于性别包容性和社会文明的方式来构成刑法主体的挑战仍然有待充分应对。