Prior research on classification shifting finds that managers opportunistically shift core operating expenses down the income statement into the non-recurring expenses category to improve earnings metrics that are not based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) without changing the GAAP net income. By using a difference-in-differences design based on the availability of analysts’ GAAP earnings forecasts following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), we find that the introduction of analysts’ GAAP forecasts significantly attenuates the positive association between unexpected core earnings and non-GAAP exclusions for firms with GAAP forecasts. This association strengthens for control firms for which analysts do not issue GAAP forecasts. Our results indicate that classification shifting, which commonly results in a simultaneous inflation of core earnings and non-GAAP exclusions, has been effectively mitigated consequent to the transparency on forecasted non-GAAP exclusions brought about by the growth of analysts’ GAAP forecasts. Our study contributes to the literature by identifying a new mechanism for effectively constraining classification shifting after SOX. Moreover, our findings have important implications for standard setters and regulators advocating for greater transparency in financial information, and emphasize the value of the analyst as an effective information intermediary to capital markets.

先前有关分类转移的研究发现，经理们会在不更改GAAP净收入的情况下，将核心运营费用从利润表中向下转移到非经常性费用类别中，以改善不基于公认会计原则（GAAP）的收入指标。通过使用基于萨班斯-奥克斯利法案（SOX）颁布后分析师的GAAP收益预测的差异设计，我们发现引入分析师的GAAP预测显着削弱了非预期核心之间的正相关关系具有GAAP预测的公司的收入和非GAAP排除项。对于分析师没有发布GAAP预测的控制公司，该关联会加强。我们的结果表明分类发生了变化，通常，这会导致核心收益和非GAAP排除项目同时出现通货膨胀，因此有效地缓解了这种情况，这是由于分析师的GAAP预测的增长带来了对预测的非GAAP排除项目的透明性。我们的研究通过确定一种有效抑制SOX后分类转移的新机制，为文献做出了贡献。此外，我们的发现对标准制定者和监管者提倡财务信息更加透明具有重要意义，并强调了分析师作为资本市场有效信息中介者的价值。我们的研究通过确定有效限制SOX后分类转移的新机制，为文献做出了贡献。此外，我们的发现对标准制定者和监管者提倡财务信息更加透明具有重要的意义，并强调了分析师作为资本市场有效信息中介者的价值。我们的研究通过确定一种有效抑制SOX后分类转移的新机制，为文献做出了贡献。此外，我们的发现对标准制定者和监管者提倡财务信息更加透明具有重要意义，并强调了分析师作为资本市场有效信息中介者的价值。