This study investigates whether corporate governance protects the interests of all shareholders when Korean business groups implement the practice of tax-motivated income shifting. Income transfer among affiliated firms can be an optimal tax strategy for a business group as a whole. However, such a strategy may not benefit all shareholders of related firms, especially the minority shareholders of those whose profits are shifted out. This study examines whether the structure of affiliates’ boards plays a monitoring role for their shareholders in situations where the affiliates’ interests conflict with those of the business group. Results suggest that the structure of Korean business groups’ board of directors fails to discourage tax-induced income shifting activities, except for the existence of accounting or finance experts. Overall, our findings highlight the need to improve corporate governance to more effectively protect the minority shareholders of Korean business groups.

这项研究调查了当韩国企业集团实施税收动机的收入转移做法时，公司治理是否保护了所有股东的利益。关联公司之间的收入转移可能是整个企业集团的最佳税收策略。但是，这种策略可能不会使关联公司的所有股东受益，尤其是利润转移出去的少数股东。本研究探讨了在关联企业的利益与企业集团的利益冲突的情况下，关联企业董事会的结构是否对其股东起到监督作用。结果表明，除了会计或财务专家的存在外，韩国企业集团董事会的结构没有阻止税收引起的收入转移活动。总体，