This bold and invigorating work presents a rigorous argument for a version of moral education which aims to bring it about both that children subscribe to moral standards in their conative, affective and behavioural dispositions and believe them to be justified. It also sets out with refreshing clarity the main obstacle to this aim, namely that there is reasonable disagreement about both the content and justification of morality, yet teaching propositions as true, or standards as justified, when there is reasonable disagreement about them is indoctrinatory (indoctrination being defined here as imparting beliefs by non-rational means). Three common attempts to deal with this problem – moral education is unnecessary; a bit of indoctrination is not so bad; simply teach about morality rather than in it – are crisply dismissed. Hand also effectively rules out second-order arguments for subscribing to a moral code based on consensus and convergence: only non-indoctrinatory directive moral enquiry will do the job and that is possible only if there is a robust first-order justification for subscription that children can grasp. Fortunately, Hand argues, moral disagreement does not go all the way down: some moral standards are indeed robustly justified by a contractarian theory based on what Copp has called ‘the problem of sociality’. Left unchecked, the combination of three features of the human condition – rough equality, limited sympathy and moderately scarce resources – lead to conflict and a breakdown in trust and cooperation. If we are to live in peaceful and productive groups, we need the kind of motivation that only full commitment to universallyenlisting and penaltyendorsingmoral standards can provide. These standards are, therefore, rationally justified and parents and teachers can engage in moral formation and directive moral enquiry without being charged with indoctrination. It is an argument which is for the main firmly located within a Kantian and neoKantian framework (plus a strong reliance on Humean sympathy). It views morality in terms of prohibited, permitted and required actions based on rational rules (Hand thinks we are ‘rule-following creatures’ (19), and views reason as both universal and universally understood as such. Within this framework, Hand constructs his theory with precision and care and his position has many strengths, particularly in its admirable refusal to duck tough questions. Teachers should engage in directive moral enquiry (though perhaps by tactful, nondidactic means) to steer children away from unsound standards and unjustified arguments, even if that means going against what is being taught at home: ‘it is more important to make children aware that they are not obliged to accept any

中文翻译：

---

呼吁道德武器：迈克尔汉德道德教育理论回顾

这部大胆而振奋人心的作品为一种道德教育版本提出了严格的论据，该版本旨在使儿童在其意动、情感和行为倾向中遵守道德标准，并相信这些标准是合理的。它还以令人耳目一新的清晰方式阐明了实现这一目标的主要障碍，即对道德的内容和正当性存在合理的分歧，但教导命题为真，或标准为正当的，当对它们存在合理的分歧时，则是灌输。灌输在这里被定义为通过非理性方式传授信仰）。解决这个问题的三种常见尝试——德育是不必要的；一点点灌输也不错；简单地教授道德而不是其中的道德 - 被明确地驳回。汉德还有效地排除了订阅基于共识和趋同的道德准则的二阶论点：只有非教化的指导性道德探究才能完成这项工作，而且只有当孩子们有强有力的一阶理由来支持订阅时，这才是可能的能把握。幸运的是，汉德认为，道德上的分歧并没有完全消失：一些道德标准确实得到了基于 Copp 所谓的“社会性问题”的契约理论的有力证明。如果任其发展，人类状况的三个特征——粗略的平等、有限的同情和适度稀缺的资源——的结合会导致冲突和信任与合作的破裂。如果我们要生活在和平而富有成效的群体中，我们需要那种只有完全致力于普遍征募和惩罚背书道德标准才能提供的动力。因此，这些标准是合理的，家长和教师可以进行道德形成和指导性道德探究，而无需进行灌输。这是一个主要坚定地位于康德和新康德框架内的论点（加上对休谟式同情的强烈依赖）。它根据基于理性规则的禁止、允许和要求的行为来看待道德（汉德认为我们是“遵守规则的生物”（19），并将理性视为普遍的和普遍理解的。在这个框架内，汉德构建了他的他的立场具有许多优点，尤其是在拒绝回避棘手问题方面令人钦佩。