Bourdieu's concept of habitus relies heavily on insights from phenomenology, yet his theoretical effort falls short of existing phenomenological solutions to the problems of cognition, agency, and reflexivity in social action. These shortcomings are evident in the analytical and descriptive failures of the concept of habitus documented by critics. Turning to the work of Alfred Schutz, this paper offers his concept of pragma, meaning context, and theory of relevances as an alternative way to describe the embodied and temporal nature of social action and accounting for social determinations. The paper further parses out key differences between Schutz's social phenomenological understanding of embodied action and Bourdieu's habitus, including differences in understanding schemas of standardization and their relation with objectivities of the social world. The paper ends with a call for a critical reassessment of Schutz's social phenomenology, with potentially wide ranging implications not only for understandings of agency, but also of meaning and the constitution of objectivities of the social world, as well the underlying interpretive method of social science.

中文翻译：

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从习性到实用主义：布迪厄习性的现象学批判

布迪厄的惯性概念在很大程度上依赖于现象学的见解，但他的理论努力仍不足以解决社会行为中认知，代理和反身问题的现有现象学解决方案。这些缺点在批评家所记录的惯性概念的分析和描述性失败中很明显。谈到阿尔弗雷德·舒茨（Alfred Schutz）的工作，本文提供了他的实用主义概念，含义上下文和相关理论，作为描述社会行为的体现性和时间性以及对社会决定的解释的另一种方法。本文进一步分析了舒茨对具体行动的社会现象学理解与布迪厄的习惯之间的主要区别，包括对标准化方案理解的差异以及它们与社会世界客观性的关系。本文最后呼吁对舒茨的社会现象进行批判性的重新评估，这不仅对代理的理解，而且对社会世界的意义和客观构成以及社会科学的基本解释方法的潜在广泛影响。