Do people think individuals with Substance Use Disorder (SUD) have freewill? How does addiction science inform views on the issue? We distinguish between two senses of freewill: 1) libertarian freewill, in which freedom turns on a particular metaphysical conception of action (sometimes operationalized as “could have done otherwise”), and 2) compatibilist freewill, in which freedom depends on the relation between the actor's psychology and her actions (e.g., “was the act what she wanted to do?”). We argue that, in different ways, scientific accounts can impact conceived freewill by linking addictive behavior to mechanisms that observers view as peripheral to the actor (motivation modularity). While a variety of impacts on conceived compatibilist freewill are plausible, we argue that contemporary addiction science has no direct bearing on conceived libertarian freewill. Addiction science may, however, indirectly impact conceived libertarian freewill by priming an explanatory framework in which intention is superfluous (especially materialism).

中文翻译：

---

成瘾科学与对自由意志的认识

人们是否认为患有物质使用障碍（SUD）的人有自由意志？成瘾科学如何告知对此问题的看法？我们区分两种自由意志：1）自由主义者的自由意志，其中自由基于特定的形而上学的行动概念（有时可以“以其他方式可以实现”）； 2）相容主义者的自由意志，其中自由取决于相互之间的关系。演员的心理和她的行为（例如，“她想做什么？ ”）。我们认为，科学的表述可以通过将成瘾行为与观察者视为参与者的外围机制（动机模块性）联系起来，从而以不同的方式影响设想的自由意志。。尽管对设想的兼容主义者的自由意志的各种影响是合理的，但我们认为，当代成瘾科学与设想的自由主义者的自由意志没有直接关系。然而，成瘾科学可以通过启动一个解释框架，间接地影响自由主义者的自由意志，在该框架中意图是多余的（尤其是唯物主义）。