What are the effects of corporate self-reporting schemes on deterrence of corporate crime? This paper presents a model to analyze this question for the case in which a firm's manager, who has stock-based compensation, commits a corporate crime and the firm conducts self-policing and self-reporting. Corporate self-reporting schemes may enhance deterrence if the level of corporate leniency is within a certain range. But the level of corporate leniency has a non-monotonic relationship with deterrence in that range: as the level of corporate sanctions decreases, receding from the upper limit of the range, the probability of crime occurring first decreases and then increases. The paper also considers the case in which both individual and corporate self-reporting programs are introduced. The social desirability of individual self-reporting schemes depends on whether firms can commit to a certain level of self-policing efforts.

公司自我报告制度对遏制公司犯罪有何影响？本文提供了一个模型来分析此问题，该案例适用于以下情况：公司经理基于股票的报酬，犯了公司罪行，而公司进行自我监管和自我报告。如果企业宽大处理的水平在一定范围内，企业自我报告计划可能会增强威慑力。但是公司宽容程度与威慑力在该范围内是非单调的关系：随着公司制裁程度的降低，从范围的上限下降，犯罪发生的可能性先降低然后增加。本文还考虑了同时引入个人和公司自我报告程序的情况。