Standard intuition in a multiple buyers-single seller framework suggests that the buyer who is willing to pay the most for an object under sale would acquire it not only under a take-it-or-leave-it (TOLI) selling mechanism but also under bargaining with the seller, assuming of course that the buyers are not differentiated in terms of bargaining power. In this note we present a frequently encountered model where this principle fails to hold. We consider a Cournot market with two asymmetric firms, which are the potential buyers of a license to the use of a cost-reducing technology. We compare the licensing outcome of the optimal TOLI mechanism with the outcome of a bargaining procedure. Surprisingly, we show that although the inefficient firm obtains the license under the optimal TOLI licensing mechanism, the result is reversed under bargaining, namely the efficient firm acquires it. As a byproduct, we obtain that market efficiency is lower under bargaining than under the optimal TOLI mechanism.

中文翻译：

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谈判许可证：一个违反直觉的结果

多买家-单卖家框架中的标准直觉表明，愿意为出售中的物品支付最高费用的买家不仅会在接受或离开 (TOLI) 销售机制下获得它，而且还会在与卖方讨价还价，当然假设买方在议价能力方面没有区别。在本说明中，我们提出了一个经常遇到的模型，其中该原则不成立。我们考虑一个有两家不对称公司的古诺市场，这两家公司是使用降低成本技术的许可的潜在买家。我们将最佳 TOLI 机制的许可结果与谈判程序的结果进行比较。令人惊讶的是，我们表明，尽管效率低下的公司在最优 TOLI 许可机制下获得了许可，但在讨价还价下结果却相反，即有效率的公司获得它。作为副产品，我们发现在讨价还价下的市场效率低于最优 TOLI 机制下的市场效率。