This paper investigates the impact of a stricter tax compliance policy on firms’ pollution emissions in the presence of labor market frictions. In contrast to a situation with perfect labor markets, we find that under the right-to-manage wage formation, a stricter compliance policy increases emissions when the shadow cost of the emission limit is excluded, whereas it has no impact when the shadow cost is included. With efficient bargaining, a stricter compliance policy decreases (or increases) pollution emissions under employment (wage) orientation but has no impact on pollution emissions under wage neutrality.

中文翻译：

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有工会的情况下税收合规政策的环境有效性

本文调查了在劳动力市场摩擦的情况下更严格的税收合规政策对企业污染排放的影响。与完美劳动力市场的情况相比，我们发现在管理权工资形成的情况下，当排除排放限制的影子成本时，更严格的合规政策会增加排放，而当影子成本被排除时，则没有影响。包括。通过有效的讨价还价，更严格的合规政策会减少（或增加）就业（工资）导向下的污染排放，但对工资中性下的污染排放没有影响。