This article studies efficiency in a general class of search models where both unemployed and employed workers search for better jobs and can meet multiple firms simultaneously. Employers can respond to outside offers and wages are a weighted average of the productivities of the current employer and a credible poaching firm. I derive a condition that balances firms' bargaining power and their meeting externality. This condition ensures efficiency of both worker turnover and firm entry. Finally, the efficiency condition unifies and extends many of the results on the efficiency of equilibrium search models.

中文翻译：

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在职搜索进行工资讨价还价的效率

本文研究了一般搜索模型中的效率，在该模型中，失业工人和就业工人都在寻找更好的工作，并且可以同时满足多家公司的需求。雇主可以回应外界的提议，工资是当前雇主和一家可靠的偷猎公司的生产率的加权平均值。我得出一个条件，要求平衡公司的议价能力和会议外部性。这种条件确保了工人更替和公司进入的效率。最后，效率条件统一并扩展了关于均衡搜索模型效率的许多结果。