This study investigates how firm structure, chief executive officer (CEO) power, and federal legislation influence hiring of corporate directors from a diverse background. Combining the value-in-diversity hypothesis and the similarity-attraction paradigm, we examine the impact of economically rational (i.e., business need) and social preference (i.e., similar-to-me bias) drivers of board diversity post-the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from an eight-year period spanning SOX, we find that SOX is positively correlated with board diversity. Although SOX was not intended to increase board diversity, the changes it put in place have subsequently facilitated more board diversity. Results show that the economically rational predictor (firm operational complexity) had a positive and statistically significant effect on board diversity pre-SOX but that effect disappeared post-SOX. Meanwhile, CEO power, a social preference inhibitor of board diversity, had a negative and statistically significant relationship with board diversity pre-SOX which also disappeared post-SOX. It appears that SOX has mitigated both economically rational drivers to want more diversity as well as social preference drivers to want less diversity. Implications of these findings for research and practice are discussed.

中文翻译：

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董事会多元化的驱动因素：萨班斯-奥克斯利法案的影响

本研究调查了公司结构、首席执行官 (CEO) 权力和联邦立法如何影响来自不同背景的公司董事的招聘。结合多元化价值假设和相似性吸引力范式，我们研究了经济理性（即业务需求）和社会偏好（即与我相似的偏见）驱动因素对萨班斯法案后董事会多元化的影响—— 2002 年奥克斯利法案 (SOX)。使用跨越 SOX 的八年期间的标准普尔 1500 公司样本，我们发现 SOX 与董事会多元化正相关。尽管 SOX 的目的不是为了增加董事会的多样性，但它所做的改变随后促进了更多的董事会多元化。结果表明，经济上合理的预测因素（公司运营复杂性）对 SOX 之前的董事会多样性具有积极且统计上显着的影响，但这种影响在 SOX 之后消失了。同时，作为董事会多元化的社会偏好抑制因素的 CEO 权力与 SOX 之前的董事会多元化呈负相关且具有统计显着性关系，而在 SOX 之后也消失了。似乎 SOX 既减轻了经济上理性的驱动因素以希望更多的多样性，也减轻了社会偏好驱动因素希望减少的多样性。讨论了这些发现对研究和实践的影响。与 SOX 之前的董事会多样性呈负且统计上显着的关系，而在 SOX 之后也消失了。似乎 SOX 既减轻了经济上理性的驱动因素想要更多的多样性，也减轻了社会偏好驱动因素想要减少的多样性。讨论了这些发现对研究和实践的影响。与 SOX 之前的董事会多样性呈负且统计上显着的关系，而在 SOX 之后也消失了。似乎 SOX 既减轻了经济上理性的驱动因素想要更多的多样性，也减轻了社会偏好驱动因素想要减少的多样性。讨论了这些发现对研究和实践的影响。