The purpose of this study is to shed light on the effects of the CEO pay ratio and say‐on‐pay votes on directors' concerns about CEO pay equity. Investigation of the pay ratio disclosure rule offers opportunities to gain insights into whether equity perceptions associated with mandated pay ratio disclosure have significant effects on remuneration decisions in organizations. We conduct an online experiment with practicing corporate directors to examine the effects of CEO pay ratio disclosures and say‐on‐pay (SOP) votes on director decisions. Results indicate that CEO pay ratio disclosures significantly influence directors' decisions regarding executive compensation, leading directors to be less willing to increase CEO pay when the pay ratio is above the industry average pay ratio. Results also demonstrate that say‐on‐pay votes only influence directors' compensation decisions when the CEO pay ratio is above the industry average. Directors in firms with pay ratios that are above the industry average are less willing to increase CEO pay when they anticipate shareholder votes against a CEO pay increase than when they anticipate positive SOP voting outcomes. Directors in firms with CEO pay ratios that are below the industry average, however, are willing to increase CEO pay regardless of SOP voting outcomes.

中文翻译：

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对公司董事对CEO薪酬比率披露和薪酬投票的回应的调查

这项研究的目的是阐明CEO薪酬比率的影响，并在董事对CEO薪酬公平性的担忧中采用“按比例说票”投票。薪酬比率披露规则的调查提供了机会，以了解与法定薪酬比率披露相关的股权观念是否对组织的薪酬决策有重大影响。我们与在职的公司董事进行了在线实验，以检查首席执行官薪酬比率披露和对董事决策的“按酬收”（SOP）投票的影响。结果表明，CEO薪酬比率的披露对董事关于高管薪酬的决定有重大影响，当薪酬比率高于行业平均薪酬比率时，领导董事不愿意增加CEO薪酬。结果还表明，只有首席执行官的薪酬比率高于行业平均水平时，“按酬劳投票”投票才会影响董事的薪酬决定。薪酬比率高于行业平均水平的公司中的董事在期望股东投票反对CEO薪酬增加时，比他们预期SOP投票会产生积极结果时，更不愿意增加CEO薪酬。然而，无论SOP投票结果如何，首席执行官薪酬比率低于行业平均水平的公司的董事都愿意增加CEO薪酬。