We analyze power relationships in subsidiaries of multinational corporations. We explain how despite many advances in the literature, there is still an unresolved debate with respect to the critical question of whether subsidiary power is loaned or owned. We develop an overarching framework that encompasses both agency theory and resource dependence theory as the two pillars to understand decision‐making by managers in subsidiaries. We propose that agency theory applies more when the subsidiary's decision rights are “loaned” by headquarters, while resource dependence theory applies more when the subsidiary “owns” its decision rights. We also explain how subsidiary evolution integrates the arguments of these two theories. Agency appears to apply earlier while resource dependence is more relevant at later stages.

中文翻译：

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子公司权力：贷款还是拥有？代理理论和资源依赖理论的视角

我们分析了跨国公司子公司中的权力关系。我们解释了尽管在文学上有许多进步，但是关于附属权是借出还是拥有的关键问题仍然存在未解决的争论。我们开发了一个包含代理理论和资源依赖理论的总体框架，将其作为理解子公司管理者决策的两个支柱。我们建议当总部“借用”子公司的决策权时，代理理论更适用，而当子公司“拥有”其决策权时，资源依赖理论更适用。我们还解释了辅助进化如何将这两种理论的论点整合在一起。代理商似乎较早申请，而资源依赖在以后阶段更为重要。