The economic exchange view of corporate tax compliance holds that when governments fail to provide adequate public services, firms comply less with taxes as quid pro quo. However, firms differ widely in the degree to which they respond to government inefficiencies in the form of tax noncompliance. We argue that such heterogeneity is largely because firm–government economic exchanges do not happen in a vacuum, but rather within the context of social exchange. Factors such as bribery, tax compliance burden, and consistency of tax enforcement affect firms' perceptions of fairness and trust in the social contract and moderate the quid pro quo in the economic exchange. We find broad support for our hypotheses in a sample from transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

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企业与政府的关系：企业税收合规的社会交流观点

关于公司税收合规性的经济交换观点认为，当政府无法提供适当的公共服务时，企业以税收为交换条件就较少遵守税收。但是，企业在应对政府效率低下的方式上有很大的不同，这些形式是税收不合规。我们认为，这种异质性很大程度上是因为公司与政府之间的经济交流不是在真空中进行的，而是在社会交流的背景下进行的。贿赂，税收合规负担和税收执法的一致性等因素影响着企业对社会契约的公正性和信任感，并影响了经济交换中的交换条件。我们从东欧和中亚转型经济体的样本中发现了对我们假设的广泛支持。