The global strategy literature highlights the role of headquarters (HQ) in realizing global integration benefits while enabling independent subsidiary strategic initiatives. We construct a game‐theoretic model of the interaction between HQ and subsidiaries, and, building on procedural justice theory, we analyze the motivational costs that can result from the anticipation or realization of HQ intervention in subsidiary initiatives. We also analyze the implications for MNC‐level value creation when HQ managers, fearing subsidiary managers’ emotion‐based reactions, refrain from intervening. We derive a number of counter‐intuitive results, for example, that good HQ behavior may involve forgoing opportunities for value creation, and that procedural justice systems may sometimes be counterproductive.

中文翻译：

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程序正义在全球战略和附属倡议中的作用

全球战略文献着重强调了总部（HQ）在实现全球整合收益的同时实现独立子公司战略计划的作用。我们构建了总部与子公司之间互动的博弈模型，并基于程序正义理论，我们分析了总部对子公司举措的预期或实现可能导致的激励成本。当总部经理担心子公司经理基于情感的反应而避免干预时，我们还分析了跨国公司价值创造的意义。我们得出了许多违反直觉的结果，例如，良好的总部行为可能会涉及放弃创造价值的机会，而程序司法制度有时可能适得其反。