This article looks at the phenomenon of ‘defensive regulatory competition’ in European corporate law following Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art. In order to retain control over the corporate governing private limited entities operating within their territories and to prevent the proliferation of ‘foreign limited’ formations, Member States have modified some of the features of their laws that company founders consider to be the most unattractive, such as minimum capital and time-consuming incorporation procedures. The first part of the article analyzes the market for the law governing privately held firms, drawing from the debate in the United States. The US and Europe differ in that regulatory competition, as far as substantive law is concerned, focuses mainly on ex post mechanisms such as directors’ duties and veil piercing. By contrast, European competition seems to be driven by ex ante issues relating to firm formation, such as minimum capital. The second part of the article draws on an ongoing empirical research project that attempts to explore the effects of regulatory competition and uses reforms in Germany and Belgium as examples. Regression analysis suggests that at least the German 2008 reform had a minor effect on the number of UK private limited companies being set up to do business in Germany.

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Centros和防御性监管竞争：一些想法和数据瞥见

本文着眼于Centros，Überseering和Inspire Art之后的欧洲公司法中的“防御性监管竞争”现象。为了保持对在其领土内运营的私人有限实体的公司治理的控制并防止“外国有限”形式的扩散，会员国修改了其法律的某些特征，这些特征被公司创始人认为最没有吸引力，例如作为最低资本和耗时的注册程序。本文的第一部分从美国的辩论中分析了管辖私营公司的法律的市场。美国和欧洲的不同之处在于，就实体法而言，监管竞争主要集中于事后机制，例如董事职责和揭穿面纱。相比之下，欧洲竞争似乎是事前驱动的与公司成立有关的问题，例如最低资本。本文的第二部分借鉴了一个正在进行的实证研究项目，该项目试图探索监管竞争的影响，并以德国和比利时的改革为例。回归分析表明，至少德国2008年的改革对在德国经商的英国私人有限公司的数量影响较小。