This paper compares earnings management (EM) and capital management (CM) by Russian banks before and after changes in banking regulation and oversight in Russia. In Russia, in recent years, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation has imposed new regulations on banks. In addition, the Central Bank has strengthened its oversight by revoking the license of a large number of banks. Hence, we compare EM and CM before and after these changes in regulation and oversight. We focus on the use of loan-loss provisions (LLPs) for EM and CM. We have three main results. First, we find that banks use LLPs for EM both before and after these changes in regulation and oversight. However, banks’ use of LLPs for EM is similar pre- and post-changes. Second, for the entire sample period, we find mixed evidence of the relationship between capital and LLPs. However, post-changes, the relationship between capital and LLPs is more negative relative to pre-changes. This result is consistent with stronger oversight by regulators post-changes. Third, the difference in CM post-changes relative to pre-changes is different for government-owned banks than for private banks.

本文比较了俄罗斯银行监管和监督变化前后俄罗斯银行的盈余管理 (EM) 和资本管理 (CM)。在俄罗斯，近年来，俄罗斯联邦中央银行对银行实施了新规定。此外，央行通过吊销大量银行牌照，加强监管。因此，我们比较了这些监管和监督变化前后的 EM 和 CM。我们专注于对新兴市场和新兴市场的贷款损失准备金 (LLP) 的使用。我们有三个主要结果。首先，我们发现银行在监管和监督发生这些变化之前和之后都将 LLP 用于 EM。然而，银行对 EM 的 LLP 使用在变化前后是相似的。其次，在整个样本期间，我们发现了资本与 LLP 之间关系的混合证据。然而，变更后，资本与 LLP 之间的关系相对于变更前更为负向。这一结果与监管机构在变更后加强监管是一致的。第三，国有银行与民营银行的 CM 变化后相对于变化前的差异是不同的。