A principal aware that an agent exerts little effort will nevertheless fund the agent, because the principal values the output the agent produces. The agent in turn decides how hard to work by anticipating how his behavior affects the budget the principal will give him. Under some conditions, the principal gives the agent large budgets anticipating that the agent will not work hard. The corrupt environment aggravates the problem. An agent who can set the budget ameliorates the problem, though incompletely.

中文翻译：

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无效的特工如何增加预算

委托人知道代理人付出的努力很少，但仍会为代理人提供资金，因为委托人重视代理人产生的产出。反过来，代理人通过预期其行为将如何影响委托人将给他的预算来决定工作的难度。在某些情况下，委托人会给代理商提供大量预算，以期望代理商不会努力工作。腐败的环境加剧了这个问题。可以设置预算的业务代表可以缓解此问题，尽管它不完全。