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Upstream or Downstream: Who Should Provide Trade-in Services in Dyadic Supply Chains?*
Decision Sciences ( IF 2.8 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-04 , DOI: 10.1111/deci.12476
Fei Tang 1 , Zu‐Jun Ma 1 , Ying Dai 1 , Tsan‐Ming Choi 2
Affiliation  

As observed in real-world practices, trade-ins can be offered by either the manufacturer or the retailer. The party offering the trade-in program faces the trade-off between the fixed trade-in cost incurred and the additional revenue generated. By conducting a game-theoretic study, we analytically explore in this article the optimal choice of trade-in provider in a dyadic supply chain with a single manufacturer and a single retailer. We show that the trade-in models can bear a much higher manufacturing cost and induce a higher new product sale than the benchmark case without trade-ins. It is possible that both the manufacturer and retailer prefer to undertake the trade-in program, which would lead to a conflict; or both firms prefer to be a free rider instead of being the trade-in provider, which would fall into a prisoner's dilemma. Moreover, the powerful manufacturer has an incentive to delegate the trade-in service to the retailer when facing a higher fixed trade-in cost, but the delegation option is always worse off for the retailer compared to the scenario in which the retailer provides trade-ins by herself. We also show that the trade-in scenarios always benefit the environment and consumers of the replacement segment, but hurt the primary segment consumers. The social welfare would actually be higher in the scenarios with trade-ins if the fixed trade-in cost is relatively low and the residual value of old products is relatively high.

中文翻译:

上游或下游:谁应该在二元供应链中提供以旧换新服务?*

正如在现实世界中观察到的那样,以旧换新可以由制造商或零售商提供。提供以旧换新计划的一方面临着发生的固定的以旧换新成本和产生的额外收入之间的权衡。通过进行博弈论研究,我们在本文中分析探讨了在具有单一制造商和单一零售商的二元供应链中以旧换新供应商的最佳选择。我们表明,与没有以旧换新的基准案例相比,以旧换新模型可以承受更高的制造成本并引发更高的新产品销售。制造商和零售商都可能更愿意进行以旧换新计划,这会导致冲突;或者两家公司都更愿意搭便车而不是折价提供者,这会陷入囚徒困境。而且,当面临更高的固定折价成本时,强大的制造商有动力将折价服务委托给零售商,但与零售商提供折价的情况相比,委托选项对零售商来说总是更糟她自己。我们还表明,以旧换新方案总是有利于替代细分市场的环境和消费者,但伤害了主要细分市场的消费者。如果固定的以旧换新成本相对较低,旧产品的残值相对较高,那么在以旧换新的场景中,社会福利实际上会更高。但与零售商自己提供以旧换新的情况相比,委托选项对零售商来说总是更糟。我们还表明,以旧换新方案总是有利于替代细分市场的环境和消费者,但伤害了主要细分市场的消费者。如果固定的以旧换新成本相对较低,旧产品的残值相对较高,那么在以旧换新的场景中,社会福利实际上会更高。但与零售商自己提供以旧换新的情况相比,委托选项对零售商来说总是更糟。我们还表明,以旧换新方案总是有利于替代细分市场的环境和消费者,但伤害了主要细分市场的消费者。如果固定的以旧换新成本相对较低,旧产品的残值相对较高,那么在以旧换新的场景中,社会福利实际上会更高。
更新日期:2020-09-04
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