Should a firm, which seeks to subcontract a new product development project, leverage competition among potential suppliers and ask all of them to engage in research and development in parallel? Or should it first invite offers and commit to the supplier with the best offer, before only this supplier engages in development? Building on analytical literature on both formats, we apply game theory to answer these questions. We identify Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies and characterize advantages of both formats. We find that having multiple suppliers engage in new product development in parallel is favored only if enough suppliers can be attracted, which is the case when development uncertainty and learning benefits are high. The participation decision also depends on the specific structure of the project's development costs. If administrative overhead and material costs are substantial, while engaging in development and exerting effort is relatively cheap but does not offer many learning opportunities, the number of suppliers who would be willing to engage in parallel development is limited. First inviting offers and selecting the best supplier to exclusively engage in new product development then becomes more attractive for the buyer. We discuss further implications and characterize environments that may foster more innovativeness in this context.

中文翻译：

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分包新产品开发项目：竞争和承诺的作用

寻求分包新产品开发项目的公司是否应该利用潜在供应商之间的竞争并要求所有供应商同时进行研发？还是应该先邀请报价并承诺给报价最好的供应商，然后只有这个供应商参与开发？基于两种格式的分析文献，我们应用博弈论来回答这些问题。我们确定了贝叶斯纳什均衡策略并描述了两种格式的优势。我们发现，只有在能够吸引足够多的供应商的情况下，让多个供应商并行参与新产品开发才是有利的，这就是开发不确定性和学习收益高的情况。参与决策还取决于项目开发成本的具体结构。如果管理费用和材料成本很高，而从事开发和努力的成本相对较低，但没有提供很多学习机会，那么愿意从事并行开发的供应商数量有限。首先邀请报价并选择最好的供应商专门从事新产品开发，然后对买方更具吸引力。我们讨论了进一步的影响并描述了可能在这种情况下促进更多创新的环境。首先邀请报价并选择最好的供应商专门从事新产品开发，然后对买方更具吸引力。我们讨论了进一步的影响并描述了可能在这种情况下促进更多创新的环境。首先邀请报价并选择最好的供应商专门从事新产品开发，然后对买方更具吸引力。我们讨论了进一步的影响并描述了可能在这种情况下促进更多创新的环境。