Lee (2020) provides a fairly crispy analysis of economic reforms underway in Malaysia subsequent to the dramatic regime change through the ballot box on May 9, 2018. As is often said, there is more to it than meets the eye.

Economic reforms have long been overdue in Malaysia. There were no reforms even in the aftermath of the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis. While many affected countries in the region, including South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, undertook serious reforms with International Monetary Fund (IMF) guidance in the wake of currency meltdown and political upheaval, Malaysia remained in a denial mode, blaming currency speculators. Malaysia was able to desist IMF intervention, as its short‐term external debt was small enough to be managed on its own, with no political fallout.

There has been a crying call for reforms in Malaysia with the sacking of the then Finance and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 by the then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad under whose authoritarian rule institutional checks and balances were compromised. While Mahathir might have drawn a line that he would not cross on moral grounds, there was no such restraint for his successors, which led to many mindboggling financial scandals with huge domestic and international ramifications.

Malaysia's fourteenth general election (GE‐14) was a game changer, which brought 93‐year‐old Mahathir back as prime minister, after beating the formidable incumbent coalition that had ruled the country ever since Independence in 1957. Mahathir could not have done it on his own, without Anwar's consent or the support of Anwar's multiracial Justice Party which won the largest number of seats in the parliament. The “New Malaysia” euphoria, however, has petered out, as the promised reforms became elusive.

The new regime has faced much criticisms for failing to deliver election promises. In fairness, it must be pointed out that the new government is not only saddled with huge inherited problems, but also daunted by explosive expectations. Much time has been spent cleaning up the mess left behind by the previous regime and renegotiating several lopsided big‐ticket contracts, saving costs in the billions of ringgits. Some progress has been made in the realm of governance with greater transparency and accountability. Obviously, more needs to be done. However, the magnitude and the array of political, social, economic, and institutional issues are out of the ordinary.

The GE‐14 manifesto had promised a slew of reforms which include institutional overhauls, an independent judiciary, corruption‐free administration, freedom of the press, best practices, and need‐based affirmative action plan, to mention a few, which were bandied as the hallmarks of New Malaysia. It would be foolhardy to expect New Malaysia to be in place overnight, as it takes time to evolve, perhaps a decade or two, given the nation's multiethnic social fabric where Malays constitute over 60% of the total population.

Race‐based politics runs deep in Malaysia, especially after the May 1969 racial riot which led to the New Economic Policy (NEP), giving special privileges to Malays and other indigenous ethnic groups, touted as “positive discrimination” aimed at closing the interethnic income gap. As a result, inter‐ethnic income inequality has narrowed considerably, but intraethnic disparity has widened markedly, because the NEP benefits were unevenly distributed, with politically connected people grabbing the lion's share of it. Malay households account for 80% of the bottom 40% with no more than a hand‐to‐mouth existence, which shows that NEP has failed. Hence, the rationale for a needs‐based affirmative action approach which is distinctly pro‐poor regardless of race or religion. In this, Malays will be the main beneficiaries as they constitute the bulk of the poor.

However, there are powerful vested interests agitating for race‐based affirmative agenda for political gains. Bigots and zealots are out to undermine national unity. There are claims that a “deep state” is at work to destabilize the new government, with gutter politics threatening to tear things apart. Mahathir's reluctance to set a transparent timeframe for Anwar's succession has also heightened political uncertainties. Under such tumultuous conditions, reforms can only take the back seat.

Mahathir is not a reformer. It is ironic that the proposed reforms would dismantle many things that Mahathir had left behind in his previous incarnation as prime minister. It would be naive to expect him to spearhead reforms aimed at undoing his own legacy. Reforms would be possible if and when Mahathir hands over the reins to Anwar. Voters are upset, not because the promised reforms are not yet in place, but because the political will for reforms has evaporated under Mahathir's watch.

The ruling coalition has lost four by‐elections in a row, reflecting its sagging popularity. The most shocking one was the Tanjung Piai by‐election in November 2019, when it was crushed by a massive margin. Hopefully, it may turn out to be the “best” loss suffered, if the chilling message is taken seriously by the administration. Thus, this watershed may mark either the beginning of the end, or a new beginning, for the new regime. A return to the old normal is certainly not the way to go.

Lee（2020）对2018年5月9日通过投票箱进行的政权急剧变化之后马来西亚正在进行的经济改革进行了较为清晰的分析。正如人们常说的那样，它所具有的意义不胜枚举。

马来西亚的经济改革早就该进行了。即使在1997-1998年亚洲金融危机之后，也没有进行任何改革。尽管该地区许多受影响的国家，包括韩国，泰国和印度尼西亚，在货币崩溃和政治动荡之后根据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的指导进行了认真的改革，但马来西亚仍处于否认状态，将其归咎于投机者。马来西亚能够制止国际货币基金组织的干预，因为其短期外债足够小，可以自己管理，没有政治影响。

1998年，时任总理马哈蒂尔·穆罕默德（Mahathir Mohamad）罢免了当时的财政和副总理安瓦尔·易卜拉欣（Anwar Ibrahim），马来西亚发出了哭泣的呼吁。尽管马哈蒂尔可能会划定一条线，以免他在道义上有过之而无不及，但对他的继任者却没有如此克制，这导致许多令人难以置信的金融丑闻，在国内和国际上产生了巨大的后果。

马来西亚的第十四届大选（GE-14）改变了局面，击败了自1957年独立以来统治该国的强大的现任联盟，从而将93岁的马哈蒂尔带回总理府。马哈蒂尔无法做到没有安瓦尔的同意或安瓦尔的多种族正义党的支持，他自己赢得了议会最多席位。然而，随着承诺的改革变得难以捉摸，“新马来西亚”的兴高采烈已逐渐消失。

新政权因未能兑现选举承诺而面临许多批评。公平地讲，必须指出，新政府不仅背负着巨大的继承问题，而且还面临爆炸性的期望。已经花了很多时间来清理前政权留下的混乱局面，并重新谈判几份不合理的大额合同，从而节省了数十亿林吉特的成本。在治理领域取得了一些进展，透明度和责任制更高。显然，还需要做更多的工作。但是，政治，社会，经济和体制问题的规模和范围与众不同。

GE-14宣言已承诺进行一系列改革，包括机构改革，独立司法机构，无腐败行政管理，新闻自由，最佳实践以及基于需求的平权行动计划，仅举几例，新马来西亚的标志。鉴于国家的民族社会结构，马来人占总人口的60％以上，预计新马来西亚会在一夜之间到来是很愚蠢的，因为它需要一段时间才能发展，大概需要一到两年。

基于种族的政治在马来西亚深入开展，特别是在1969年5月种族骚乱导致新经济政策（NEP）爆发后，马来人和其他土著民族获得了特殊特权，被吹捧为旨在消除种族间收入的“积极歧视”间隙。结果，族裔之间的收入不平等现象已大大缩小，但族裔内部的差距却明显扩大，这是因为NEP利益分配不均，政治上有联系的人们抢占了大部分。马来人家庭只占最底层40％人口的80％，只不过是口口相传而已，这表明NEP失败了。因此，无论种族和宗教信仰如何，基于需求的平权行动方法的基本原则是贫民。在这个

但是，有一些强大的既得利益者正在为基于种族的，旨在政治利益的平权议程而鼓动。顽固派和狂热分子正在破坏民族团结。有人声称，“深度国家”正在破坏新政府的稳定，混乱的政治威胁着将事情分解。马哈迪尔不愿为安华继任设定透明的时间表，这也加剧了政治上的不确定性。在这种动荡的条件下，改革只能让步。

马哈迪不是改革者。具有讽刺意味的是，拟议中的改革将消除马哈蒂尔在上任总理期间遗留下来的许多事情。期望他带头进行旨在消灭自己遗产的改革是天真的。如果马哈迪将the绳交给安华，改革就可能实现。选民的不满不是因为承诺的改革尚未到位，而是因为在马哈迪的领导下，改革的政治意愿已经消失。

执政联盟已连续四次补选，反映了其低迷的人气。最令人震惊的是2019年11月的丹绒庇爱补选，当时它被压倒了一大笔钱。希望如果主管部门认真对待寒意信息，那可能是遭受的“最大”损失。因此，这个分水岭可能标志着新政权的终结或新的开始。重返旧常景当然不是路要走。