Philippines under the current Duterte administration is perhaps an interesting though unsurprising case which shows illiberal democracy and liberal economic policy can coexist. Capuno (2020) clearly illustrates the phenomenon by first distinguishing and then relating Duterte's authoritarian‐populist political style (“Dutertsimo”) and his economic agenda (“Dutertenomics”).

I agree with Capuno's observation that President Duterte delegates the task of economic management to his team of economic mangers due to his lack of interest in economic affairs. The role of these economic managers and their relationship with the President cannot be underestimated. They are seasoned academics and technocrats who are liberally minded, focused on long‐time economic issues, and very conscious of macroeconomic stability as well. As mentioned by Capuno (2020), Dutertenomics consists of not only liberal economic policies, but contains some populist ones which would exert pressure on fiscal expenditure, however, by taking advice from his economic managers, President Duterte could make orthodox decisions in several cases. It remains to be seen whether this balancing act works throughout the rest of his term.

As seen in robust economic conditions, Duterte's authoritarian‐populist political style has had no crucial negative impact on the Philippine economy so far. Nonetheless, there still remains an issue among Duterte's populist rhetoric whose impact on the economy is still ambiguous, namely, his anti‐oligarchs stance. Not many measures have been taken in the past 3 years of the Duterte administration except on a few occasions. However, very recent developments on water concessions such as Duterte's resentment toward Ayala‐led Manila Water and Pangilinan‐led Maynilad Water Services Inc. for the alleged “onerous” provisions in their contracts with the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, as well as his continuing threat to block the media franchise extension of Lopez‐led ABS‐CBN can be considered as illustrating that Duterte's anti‐oligarchs stance has finally surfaced. The move may raise concerns about regulatory uncertainty and negatively affect investor confidence unless handled properly. The role of oligarchs and conglomerates cannot be belittled especially in the area of infrastructure projects which are the core of Dutertenomics. It is of interest then to know how and to what extent economic mangers and the other cabinet members as well as close associates of President Duterte handle and influence him on these cases.

Finally, Capuno (2020) analyzes Dutertismo as a social political process which is leading toward “a solution to the public goods failure” with a few convincing episodes. Meanwhile, the paper in its concluding remarks also mentions that the Duterte's authoritarian style is weakening liberal democratic institutions. A similar view of the weakening of institutions by Duterte's authoritarian‐populist political style is given by several scholars including David (2019) who noted in his column that “so long as populist authoritarianism draws approval from the people who feel betrayed by their past leaders, so long will we have institutions that, instead of checking the executive, permit themselves to be weaponized by it”. If so, Dutertismo may yet solve the weakness of institutions and regulatory governance and that it may turn out to be generating collecting action problems only to be salvaged by the strongman rule. Is there any hope left for Dutertismo to morph further to remedy the core issue of the country?

现任杜特尔特政府执政期间的菲律宾也许是一个有趣但不令人意外的案子，它表明了自由民主与自由经济政策可以共存。Capuno（2020）通过首先区分杜特尔特的专制民粹主义政治风格（“ Dutertsimo”）和他的经济议程（“ Dutertenomics”），清楚地说明了这一现象。

我同意卡普诺的观点，因为杜特尔特总统对经济事务不感兴趣，因此将经济管理的任务委托给他的经济管理者团队。这些经济管理者的作用及其与总统的关系不可低估。他们是经验丰富的学者和技术专家，思想开明，专注于长期的经济问题，也非常了解宏观经济的稳定性。正如卡普诺（2020年），杜特尔特经济学不仅包括自由的经济政策，而且还包含一些民粹主义的政策，会对财政支出施加压力。但是，杜特尔特总统通过听取经济经理的建议，可以在某些情况下做出正统的决定。这种平衡行为是否在他任期的剩余时间内都有效尚待观察。

如在强劲的经济环境中所见，杜特尔特的专制民粹主义政治风格迄今对菲律宾经济没有产生重大的负面影响。尽管如此，杜特尔特的民粹主义言论仍然存在一个问题，即他对经济的影响仍然是模棱两可的，即他的反寡头立场。在杜特尔特政府的过去三年中，除少数情况外，没有采取太多措施。但是，最近在水权方面的事态发展，例如杜特尔（Duterte）对与阿雅拉（Ayala）领导的马尼拉水务（Manila Water）和庞吉里南（Pangilinan）领导的梅尼拉德水务公司（Maynilad Water Services Inc.）的不满，因为他们与大都会自来水厂和污水处理系统的合同中涉嫌“过分”的规定，威胁阻止洛佩兹领导的ABS-CBN的媒体特许经营扩展可以被视为说明杜特尔特 反寡头的立场终于浮出水面。除非妥善处理，否则此举可能会引起对监管不确定性的担忧，并对投资者信心产生负面影响。寡头集团和大集团的作用不容小li，尤其是在基础设施项目领域，这是Dutertenomics的核心。然后，有兴趣知道经济管理者和其他内阁成员以及杜特尔特总统的亲密同事如何以及在多大程度上处理这些案件并对其产生影响。

最后，卡普诺（Capuno，2020年）将杜特里斯莫（Dutertismo ）分析为一个社会政治进程，正以一些令人信服的情节引发“解决公共物品失灵的问题”。同时，文章在总结发言中还提到，杜特尔特的威权主义风格正在削弱自由民主制度。杜特尔特（Duterte）的威权-民粹主义政治风格削弱制度的类似观点包括大卫（2019年）在他的专栏文章中指出：“只要民粹主义的专制主义得到那些被前任领导人背叛的人的认可，我们就会拥有这样的机构，只要他们不对行政机关进行检查，而允许自己被其武装起来”。如果是这样的话，杜特里斯莫可能仍将解决体制和监管治理的弱点，并可能导致产生收缴行动问题，只有强人统治才能解决。杜特里斯莫（Dutertismo）是否有进一步的希望，以解决该国的核心问题？