In recent years, one can see the emergence of a radically different economic policy paradigm, whose key characteristics include a rise of illiberalism, anti‐globalization movements, populism, economic nationalism and the emergence of democratically elected authoritarian leaders, particularly President Donald Trump. Basri and Hill (2020) provide an excellent succinct review of the economic contexts that have led to the emergence of these characteristics, which, thus far, seem to affect the advanced economies more than developing economies. The main focus of Basri and Hill (2020) is on 5 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) middle income economies, and the question whether these economies may also slide toward illiberalism, and if not, what kind of policies and reforms are needed to support these countries' continued development.

In general, I agree with Basri and Hill that the ASEAN economies will not back‐track into illiberalism. ASEAN economies are mostly export oriented economies, so they benefit from open trade regimes. Extreme populism, economic nationalism and elected authoritarian leaders are different. In Thailand, “we have seen it all before.”

The most widespread economic nationalism phase occurred as a result of the Asian financial crisis and the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Through monetary mismanagement, Thailand became insolvent in mid‐1997 and had to enter an IMF supervised program. While recovering from insolvency is bound to be painful, critics of the IMF program pointed to a number of issues, such as the harsh nature of the tight fiscal and monetary policies without due regard for social or political consequences, imposition of full guarantees for creditors of financial institutions, and the imposition of relatively rapid (fire sale type) structural reform measures. As it turned out, the large depreciation of the Baht led to a rapid turnaround of the current account. Foreign reserves rose quickly and by mid‐1999 Thailand no longer needed to make further drawings from the IMF package, and as a result, there was no need to implement IMF conditionality. Thus, structural reforms measures were not fully implemented, and in hindsight, given their controversial nature, it would have been better not to have the structural reform conditionality. In any case, the Thai (and other crisis hit countries) experience with the IMF program created a stigma for the IMF that has remained to this day.

In 1998, Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra founded his political party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT). He is a self‐made billionaire with many family businesses (like Trump). In the 2001 election, TRT won 248 seats out of 500 in parliament. It was the first time ever in Thailand that a political party had come close to winning an absolute majority in a national election, and with support from a number of other parties, Thaksin formed a government with a two thirds majority.

Using his business marketing experience, Thaksin's populist policy platform was clearly spelt out, and the electorate knew exactly what they were going to get: 30 Baht per visit health care for all, a three‐year debt moratorium for farmers, and one million baht per village revolving fund, among others. This was very different to the usual vague promises offered by other political parties and made TRT very popular, particularly in poorer areas of the country, the North and Northeast.

Thaksin's autocratic personality and self‐confidence created tensions and conflicts on many issues. Any comments critical of his policies would get immediate reprisal, with Thaksin coming out and telling the media something like, “Don't listen to these people, they don't know anything, it's just old thinking, we need new thinking and new actions”. I personally have been on the receiving end of his ire many times. Thaksin also rode on the post‐Asian Financial Crisis nationalistic sentiment. His war on drugs and associated extra‐judicial killings, which was a precursor of Duterte's war on drugs, attracted a lot of criticism, particularly internationally. When asked in 2003 about a U.N. envoy coming to Thailand to investigate the mass killings, Thaksin replied, “The United Nations is not my father.”

Another area of conflict was with the Bank of Thailand (BOT), which was not surprising given what has been happening between President Trump and the Federal Reserve. In 2000, the BOT started an inflation targeting regime. When Mr. Thaksin came to power in early 2001, the global economic environment was very weak, Thai exports were weak, economic growth was weak, and inflation was low. Under these circumstances, for whatever reason, Mr. Thaksin wanted to see a stronger Thai currency and pressured the BOT to increase the policy rate. After several months of pressures and a continuing BOT refusal to increase the rate, the Governor was sacked.

I believe that the historical path that an economy goes through is very important in shaping its future. Many of the illiberal issues emerging in the more advanced economies are issues that Thailand (and many other emerging market economies) has been through before and have shaped her policy directions. Openness will always remain a key policy direction. Unfortunately, populist policies are very addictive and are likely to remain and even expand for a long time. All the major political parties in the 2019 election had populist platforms. So far, fiscal discipline has not been compromised. If reasonable economic growth can be sustained, then fiscal discipline should remain manageable.

近年来，人们可以看到一种根本不同的经济政策范式的出现，其主要特征包括自由主义的兴起，反全球化运动，民粹主义，经济民族主义的兴起以及民主选举的独裁领导人，特别是唐纳德·特朗普总统的出现。Basri and Hill（2020）对导致这些特征出现的经济背景进行了出色的简要回顾，到目前为止，这些特征似乎对发达经济体的影响要大于对发展中经济体的影响。巴斯里和希尔（2020年）是关于5个东南亚国家联盟（ASEAN）中等收入经济体的问题，这些经济体是否还会滑向自由主义，以及是否需要采取什么样的政策和改革来支持这些国家的持续发展的问题。

总的来说，我同意巴斯里和希尔的观点，即东盟经济不会倒退为自由主义。东盟经济体大多是出口导向型经济体，因此它们受益于开放贸易制度。极端民粹主义，经济民族主义和民选专制领导人不同。在泰国，“我们以前见过的一切。”

最广泛的经济民族主义阶段是亚洲金融危机和国际货币基金组织（IMF）的作用所致。由于资金管理不善，泰国于1997年中期破产，不得不加入国际货币基金组织的监督计划。尽管从破产中恢复无疑将是痛苦的，但国际货币基金组织计划的批评者指出了许多问题，例如紧缩的财政和货币政策的苛刻性质，没有适当考虑社会或政治后果，为债权人提供充分担保金融机构，以及实行相对较快的（消防类）结构改革措施。事实证明，泰铢大幅贬值导致经常账户迅速周转。外汇储备迅速增加，到1999年年中，泰国不再需要从国际货币基金组织的一揽子计划中提款，因此，无需实施国际货币基金组织的附带条件。因此，结构性改革措施并未得到充分执行，事后看来，鉴于其有争议的性质，最好不要具有结构性改革的条件性。无论如何，泰国（以及其他遭受危机重创的国家）在国际货币基金组织计划方面的经验给国际货币基金组织带来了耻辱，直到今天。

他信·西那瓦（Thaksin Shinawatra）先生于1998年成立了他的政党Thai Rak Thai（TRT）。他是一位白手起家的亿万富翁，拥有许多家族企业（如特朗普）。在2001年的大选中，TRT赢得了议会500个席位中的248个席位。他信是泰国有史以来第一次在全国大选中接近赢得绝对多数，而他信在许多其他政党的支持下组成了三分之二多数的政府。

通过他的商业营销经验，他信的民粹主义政策平台被清楚地阐明了，而选民确切地知道了他们将获得什么：每次就医30泰铢，对所有人实行三年债务暂停，每人100万泰铢。乡村循环基金等。这与其他政党通常的含糊承诺大相径庭，并使得TRT非常受欢迎，特别是在该国较贫穷的地区，北部和东北部。

他信的专制人格和自信在许多问题上造成了紧张和冲突。批评他的政策的任何评论都将立即受到报复，他信走了出来，对媒体说，“不要听这些人，他们什么都不知道，这只是旧思想，我们需要新思想和新行动”。我个人曾多次受到他的不满。他信还利用了亚洲金融危机后的民族主义情绪。他的毒品战争和相关的法外处决是杜特尔特毒品战争的前身，引起了很多批评，尤其是在国际上。当他在2003年被问及联合国特使来泰国调查大规模杀戮时，他信回答说：“联合国不是我的父亲。”

另一个冲突领域是与泰国银行（BOT）的冲突，鉴于特朗普总统与美联储之间正在发生的事情，这并不奇怪。2000年，BOT开始实行通货膨胀目标制。他信在2001年初上台时，全球经济环境非常疲软，泰国出口疲软，经济增长疲软，通货膨胀率低。在这种情况下，无论出于何种原因，他信都希望看到泰铢升值，并向BOT施加压力，要求提高政策利率。经过几个月的压力和持续的BOT拒绝提高利率，总督被解雇。

我认为，经济发展所经历的历史道路对于塑造其未来非常重要。在较先进的经济体中出现的许多非法问题是泰国（和许多其他新兴市场经济体）以前经历过的问题，并已决定了她的政策方向。开放将始终是关键的政策方向。不幸的是，民粹主义政策非常容易上瘾，并且很可能会保留甚至长期扩展。2019年大选的所有主要政党都有民粹主义平台。到目前为止，财政纪律尚未受到损害。如果可以维持合理的经济增长，那么财政纪律应该保持可控。