Civil law is enforced primarily via private litigation. One characteristic of private enforcement is that litigation levels tend to cycle between periods of boom and bust. This article builds a theory for explaining this fluctuation, proposing that plaintiffs’ attorneys can be understood as economic migrants. Just as workers cross borders to find jobs, lawyers “move” across case types and jurisdictions to find profitable claims, and case filing numbers increase as a result. Using the recent wage and hour litigation boom as a case study, this article paints an empirical picture of attorney migration and its influence on case filing numbers.

中文翻译：

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诉讼移民

民法主要通过私人诉讼执行。私人执法的一个特征是诉讼水平倾向于在繁荣与萧条之间循环。本文建立了一种解释这种波动的理论，提出原告的律师可以理解为经济移民。就像工人越界寻找工作一样，律师在案件类型和辖区之间“移动”以找到有利可图的索赔，结果，案件备案数增加了。本文以最近的工资和小时诉讼热潮为案例研究，描绘了律师迁移及其对案件备案数的影响的经验图。